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Title: Robust Ensemble Morph Detection with Domain Generalization
Although a substantial amount of studies is dedicated to morphing detection, most of them fail to generalize for morph faces outside of their training paradigm. Moreover, recent morph detection methods are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In this paper, we intend to learn a morph detection model with high generalization to a wide range of morphing attacks and high robustness against different adversarial attacks. To this aim, we develop an ensemble of convolutional neural networks (CNNs) and Transformer models to benefit from their capabilities simultaneously. To improve the robust accuracy of the ensemble model, we employ multi-perturbation adversarial training and generate adversarial examples with high transferability for several single models. Our exhaustive evaluations demonstrate that the proposed robust ensemble model generalizes to several morphing attacks and face datasets. In addition, we validate that our robust ensemble model gains better robustness against several adversarial attacks while outperforming the state-of-the-art studies.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1650474
NSF-PAR ID:
10401293
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
2022 IEEE International Joint Conference on Biometrics (IJCB), Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
Page Range / eLocation ID:
1 to 10
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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