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We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among n agents. Various fairness notions have been proposed within the rapidly growing field of fair division, but the Nash social welfare (NSW) serves as a focal point. In part, this follows from the ‘unreasonable’ fairness guarantees provided, in the sense that a max NSW allocation meets multiple other fairness metrics simultaneously, all while satisfying a standard economic concept of efficiency, Pareto optimality. However, existing approximation algorithms fail to satisfy all of the remarkable fairness guarantees offered by a max NSW allocation, instead targeting only the specific NSW objective. We address this issue by presenting a 2 max NSW, Prop-1, 1/(2n) MMS, and Pareto optimal allocation in strongly polynomial time. Our techniques are based on a market interpretation of a fractional max NSW allocation. We present novel definitions of fairness concepts in terms of market prices, and design a new scheme to round a market equilibrium into an integral allocation in a way that provides most of the fairness properties of an integral max NSW allocation.
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Rawlsian Fairness in Online Bipartite Matching: Two-sided, Group, and Individual
Online bipartite-matching platforms are ubiquitous and find applications in important areas such as crowdsourcing and ridesharing. In the most general form, the platform consists of three entities: two sides to be matched and a platform operator that decides the matching. The design of algorithms for such platforms has traditionally focused on the operator’s (expected) profit. Since fairness has become an important consideration that was ignored in the existing algorithms a collection of online matching algorithms have been developed that give a fair treatment guarantee for one side of the market at the expense of a drop in the operator’s profit. In this paper, we generalize the existing work to offer fair treatment guarantees to both sides of the market simultaneously, at a calculated worst case drop to operator profit. We consider group and individual Rawlsian fairness criteria. Moreover, our algorithms have theoretical guarantees and have adjustable parameters that can be tuned as desired to balance the trade-off between the utilities of the three sides. We also derive hardness results that give clear upper bounds over the performance of any algorithm. A preliminary version with fewer results that was co-authored with Esmaeili, Duppala, Nanda, and Dickerson, appeared as a refereed two-page abstract at AAMAS 2022.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1918749
- PAR ID:
- 10404314
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Proc. Thirty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among n agents. Various fairness notions have been proposed within the rapidly growing field of fair division, but the Nash social welfare (NSW) serves as a focal point. In part, this follows from the 'unreasonable' fairness guarantees provided, in the sense that a max NSW allocation meets multiple other fairness metrics simultaneously, all while satisfying a standard economic concept of efficiency, Pareto optimality. However, existing approximation algorithms fail to satisfy all of the remarkable fairness guarantees offered by a max NSW allocation, instead targeting only the specific NSW objective. We address this issue by presenting a 2 max NSW, Prop-1, 1/(2n) MMS, and Pareto optimal allocation in strongly polynomial time. Our techniques are based on a market interpretation of a fractional max NSW allocation. We present novel definitions of fairness concepts in terms of market prices, and design a new scheme to round a market equilibrium into an integral allocation that provides most of the fairness properties of an integral max NSW allocation.more » « less
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
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