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This content will become publicly available on May 2, 2024

Title: Hardware Trojans based on two-dimensional memtransistors
Hardware Trojans (HTs) have emerged as a major security threat for integrated circuits (ICs) owing to the involvement of untrustworthy actors in the globally distributed semiconductor supply chain. HTs are intentional malicious modifications, which remain undetectable through simple electrical measurements but can cause catastrophic failure in the functioning of ICs in mission critical applications. In this article, we show how two-dimensional (2D) material based in-memory computing elements such as memtransistors can be used as hardware Trojans. We found that logic gates based on 2D memtransistors can be made to malfunction by exploiting their inherent programming capabilities. While we use 2D memtransistor-based ICs as the testbed for our demonstration, the results are equally applicable to any state-of-the-art and emerging in-memory computing technologies.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
2039351
NSF-PAR ID:
10412490
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
Nanoscale Horizons
Volume:
8
Issue:
5
ISSN:
2055-6756
Page Range / eLocation ID:
603 to 615
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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