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Title: Lower Bounds on Implementing Mediators in Asynchronous Systems with Rational and Malicious Agents
Abraham, Dolev, Geffner, and Halpern [ 1 ] proved that, in asynchronous systems, a (k, t)-robust equilibrium for n players and a trusted mediator can be implemented without the mediator as long as n > 4( k+t ), where an equilibrium is ( k, t )-robust if, roughly speaking, no coalition of t players can decrease the payoff of any of the other players, and no coalition of k players can increase their payoff by deviating. We prove that this bound is tight, in the sense that if n ≤ 4( k+t ) there exist ( k, t )-robust equilibria with a mediator that cannot be implemented by the players alone. Even though implementing ( k, t )-robust mediators seems closely related to implementing asynchronous multiparty ( k+t )-secure computation [ 6 ], to the best of our knowledge there is no known straightforward reduction from one problem to another. Nevertheless, we show that there is a non-trivial reduction from a slightly weaker notion of ( k+t )-secure computation, which we call ( k+t )-strict secure computation , to implementing ( k, t )-robust mediators. We prove the desired lower bound by showing that there are functions on n variables that cannot be ( k+t )-strictly securely computed if n ≤ 4( k+t ). This also provides a simple alternative proof for the well-known lower bound of 4 t +1 on asynchronous secure computation in the presence of up to t malicious agents [ 4 , 8 , 10 ].  more » « less
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Journal of the ACM
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1 to 21
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National Science Foundation
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