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Recent high-profile incidents in open-source software have greatly raised practitioner attention on software supply chain attacks. To guard against potential malicious package updates, security practitioners advocatepinningdependency to specific versions rather thanfloatingin version ranges. However, it remains controversial whether pinning carries a meaningful security benefit that outweighs the cost of maintaining outdated and possibly vulnerable dependencies. In this paper, we quantify, through counterfactual analysis and simulations, the security and maintenance impact of version constraints in the npm ecosystem. By simulating dependency resolutions over historical time points, we find that pinning direct dependencies not only (as expected) increases the cost of maintaining vulnerable and outdated dependencies, but also (surprisingly) even increases the risk of exposure to malicious package updates in larger dependency graphs due to the specifics of npm’s dependency resolution mechanism. Finally, we explore collective pinning strategies to secure the ecosystem against supply chain attacks, suggesting specific changes to npm to enable such interventions. Our study provides guidance for practitioners and tool designers to manage their supply chains more securely.
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A Large Scale Analysis of Semantic Versioning in NPM
The NPM package repository contains over two million packages and serves tens of billions of downloads per-week. Nearly every single JavaScript application uses the NPM package manager to install packages from the NPM repository. NPM relies on a “semantic versioning” (‘semver’) scheme to maintain a healthy ecosystem, where bug-fixes are reliably delivered to downstream packages as quickly as possible, while breaking changes require manual intervention by downstream package maintainers. In order to understand how developers use semver, we build a dataset containing every version of every package on NPM and analyze the flow of updates throughout the ecosystem. We build a time-travelling dependency resolver for NPM, which allows us to determine precisely which versions of each dependency would have been resolved at different times. We segment our analysis to allow for a direct analysis of security-relevant updates (those that introduce or patch vulnerabilities) in comparison to the rest of the ecosystem. We find that when developers use semver correctly, critical updates such as security patches can flow quite rapidly to downstream dependencies in the majority of cases (90.09%), but this does not always occur, due to developers’ imperfect use of both semver version constraints and semver version number increments. Our findings have implications for developers and researchers alike. We make our infrastructure and dataset publicly available under an open source license.
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- Award ID(s):
- 2102288
- PAR ID:
- 10416452
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- IEEE International Working Conference on Mining Software Repositories
- ISSN:
- 2160-1860
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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The large amount of third-party packages available in fast-moving software ecosystems, such as Node.js/npm, enables attackers to compromise applications by pushing malicious updates to their package dependencies. Studying the npm repository, we observed that many packages in the npm repository that are used in Node.js applications perform only simple computations and do not need access to filesystem or network APIs. This offers the opportunity to enforce least-privilege design per package, protecting applications and package dependencies from malicious updates. We propose a lightweight permission system that protects Node.js applications by enforcing package permissions at runtime. We discuss the design space of solutions and show that our system makes a large number of packages much harder to be exploited, almost for free.more » « less
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and often fails to installs the newest versions of dependencies; 2) NPM’s algorithm leads to duplicated dependencies and bloated code, which is particularly bad for web applications that need to minimize code size; 3) NPM’s vulnerability fixing algorithm is also greedy, and can even introduce new vulnerabilities; and 4) NPM’s ability to duplicate dependencies can break stateful frameworks and requires a lot of care to workaround. Although existing tools try to address these problems they are either brittle, rely on post hoc changes to the dependency tree, do not guarantee optimality, and are not composable. We present PacSolve, a unifying framework and implementation for dependency solving which allows for customizable constraints and optimization goals. We use PacSolve to build MaxNPM, a complete, drop-in replacement for NPM, which empowers developers to combine multiple objectives when installing dependencies. We evaluate MaxNPM with a large sample of packages from the NPM ecosystem and show that it can: 1) reduce more vulnerabilities in dependencies than NPM’s auditing tool in 33% cases; 2) chooses newer dependencies than NPM in 14% cases; and 3) chooses fewer dependencies than NPM in 21% cases. All our code and data is open and available.more » « less
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Journal Article:
- The DOI is not currently available.
