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Title: A Review on Cascading Failure Analysis for Integrated Power and Gas Systems
The increasing use of natural gas power generation has strengthened the interdependence between the power and natural gas subsystems in the integrated power and gas system (IPGS). Due to the interactions between the two subsystems, the disturbances in one system may spread to the other one, triggering a disruptive avalanche of subsequent failures in the IPGS. This paper presents a survey of cascading failure analysis for the IPGS. First, we identify the important features characterizing cascading dynamics in individual power and gas subsystems. Then, we will discuss the features for the cascading failure analysis in the IPGS and future research.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
2119691
PAR ID:
10424938
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
2022 IEEE 7th International Energy Conference (ENERGYCON)
Page Range / eLocation ID:
1 to 5
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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