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Title: WIP: Infrared Laser Reflection Attack Against Traffic Sign Recognition Systems
All vehicles must follow the rules that govern traffic behavior, regardless of whether the vehicles are human-driven or Connected, Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs). Road signs indicate locally active rules, such as speed limits and requirements to yield or stop. Recent research has demonstrated attacks, such as adding stickers or dark patches to signs, that cause CAV sign misinterpretation, resulting in potential safety issues. Humans can see and potentially defend against these attacks. But humans can not detect what they can not observe. We have developed the first physical-world attack against CAV traffic sign recognition systems that is invisible to humans. Utilizing Infrared Laser Reflection (ILR), we implement an attack that affects CAV cameras, but humans can not perceive. In this work, we formulate the threat model and requirements for an ILR-based sign perception attack. Next, we evaluate attack effectiveness against popular, CNNbased traffic sign recognition systems. We demonstrate a 100% success rate against stop and speed limit signs in our laboratory evaluation. Finally, we discuss the next steps in our research.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
2145493 1932464 1929771
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ; ; ;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
ISOC Symposium on Vehicle Security and Privacy (VehicleSec)
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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