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Title: Learning to Optimize Differentiable Games
Many machine learning problems can be abstracted in solving game theory formulations and boil down to optimizing nested objectives, such as generative adversarial networks (GANs) and multi-agent reinforcement learning. Solving these games requires finding their stable fixed points or Nash equilibrium. However, existing algorithms for solving games suffer from empirical instability, hence demanding heavy ad-hoc tuning in practice. To tackle these challenges, we resort to the emerging scheme of Learning to Optimize (L2O), which discovers problem-specific efficient optimization algorithms through data-driven training. Our customized L2O framework for differentiable game theory problems, dubbed “Learning to Play Games" (L2PG), seeks a stable fixed point solution, by predicting the fast update direction from the past trajectory, with a novel gradient stability-aware, sign-based loss function. We further incorporate curriculum learning and self-learning to strengthen the empirical training stability and generalization of L2PG. On test problems including quadratic games and GANs, L2PG can substantially accelerate the convergence, and demonstrates a remarkably more stable trajectory. Codes are available at https://github.com/VITA-Group/L2PG.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
2113904
PAR ID:
10432085
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
International Conference on Machine Learning
Volume:
202
Page Range / eLocation ID:
5036-5051
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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