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1. Incentivizing Recourse through Auditing in Strategic Classification

   Estornell, Andrew ; Chen, Yatong ; Das, Sanmay ; Liu, Yang ; Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy ( August 2023 , International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence)

   The increasing automation of high-stakes decisions with direct impact on the lives and well-being of individuals raises a number of important considerations. Prominent among these is strategic behavior by individuals hoping to achieve a more desirable outcome. Two forms of such behavior are commonly studied: 1) misreporting of individual attributes, and 2) recourse, or actions that truly change such attributes. The former involves deception, and is inherently undesirable, whereas the latter may well be a desirable goal insofar as it changes true individual qualification. We study misreporting and recourse as strategic choices by individuals within a unified framework. In particular, we propose auditing as a means to incentivize recourse actions over attribute manipulation, and characterize optimal audit policies for two types of principals, utility-maximizing and recourse-maximizing. Additionally, we consider subsidies as an incentive for recourse over manipulation, and show that even a utility-maximizing principal would be willing to devote a considerable amount of audit budget to providing such subsidies. Finally, we consider the problem of optimizing fines for failed audits, and bound the total cost incurred by the population as a result of audits. 

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2. Two for One & One for All: Two-Sided Manipulation in Matching Markets

   https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/46  

   Hosseini, Hadi ; Umar, Fatima ; Vaish, Rohit ( July 2022 , Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence Main Track.)

   Strategic behavior in two-sided matching markets has been traditionally studied in a one-sided manipulation setting where the agent who misreports is also the intended beneficiary. Our work investigates two-sided manipulation of the deferred acceptance algorithm where the misreporting agent and the manipulator (or beneficiary) are on different sides. Specifically, we generalize the recently proposed accomplice manipulation model (where a man misreports on behalf of a woman) along two complementary dimensions: (a) the two for one model, with a pair of misreporting agents (man and woman) and a single beneficiary (the misreporting woman), and (b) the one for all model, with one misreporting agent (man) and a coalition of beneficiaries (all women). Our main contribution is to develop polynomial-time algorithms for finding an optimal manipulation in both settings. We obtain these results despite the fact that an optimal one for all strategy fails to be inconspicuous, while it is unclear whether an optimal two for one strategy satisfies the inconspicuousness property. We also study the conditions under which stability of the resulting matching is preserved. Experimentally, we show that two-sided manipulations are more frequently available and offer better quality matches than their one-sided counterparts.

    

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3. Fairness Interventions as (Dis)Incentives for Strategic Manipulation

   X. Zhang, M. Khalili ( July 2022 , International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML))

   Although machine learning (ML) algorithms are widely used to make decisions about individuals in various domains, concerns have arisen that (1) these algorithms are vulnerable to strategic manipulation and "gaming the algorithm"; and (2) ML decisions may exhibit bias against certain social groups. Existing works have largely examined these as two separate issues, e.g., by focusing on building ML algorithms robust to strategic manipulation, or on training a fair ML algorithm. In this study, we set out to understand the impact they each have on the other, and examine how to characterize fair policies in the presence of strategic behavior. The strategic interaction between a decision maker and individuals (as decision takers) is modeled as a two-stage (Stackelberg) game; when designing an algorithm, the former anticipates the latter may manipulate their features in order to receive more favorable decisions. We analytically characterize the equilibrium strategies of both, and examine how the algorithms and their resulting fairness properties are affected when the decision maker is strategic (anticipates manipulation), as well as the impact of fairness interventions on equilibrium strategies. In particular, we identify conditions under which anticipation of strategic behavior may mitigate/exacerbate unfairness, and conditions under which fairness interventions can serve as (dis)incentives for strategic manipulation. 

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4. Setting the Right Expectations: Algorithmic Recourse Over Time

   https://doi.org/10.1145/3617694.3623251  

   Fonseca, João ; Bell, Andrew ; Abrate, Carlo ; Bonchi, Francesco ; Stoyanovich, Julia ( October 2023 , EAAMO '23: Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Conference on Equity and Access in Algorithms, Mechanisms, and Optimization)

   Algorithmic systems are often called upon to assist in high-stakes decision making. In light of this, algorithmic recourse, the principle wherein individuals should be able to take action against an undesirable outcome made by an algorithmic system, is receiving growing attention. The bulk of the literature on algorithmic recourse to-date focuses primarily on how to provide recourse to a single individual, overlooking a critical element: the effects of a continuously changing context. Disregarding these effects on recourse is a significant oversight, since, in almost all cases, recourse consists of an individual making a first, unfavorable attempt, and then being given an opportunity to make one or several attempts at a later date — when the context might have changed. This can create false expectations, as initial recourse recommendations may become less reliable over time due to model drift and competition for access to the favorable outcome between individuals. In this work we propose an agent-based simulation framework for studying the effects of a continuously changing environment on algorithmic recourse. In particular, we identify two main effects that can alter the reliability of recourse for individuals represented by the agents: (1) competition with other agents acting upon recourse, and (2) competition with new agents entering the environment. Our findings highlight that only a small set of specific parameterizations result in algorithmic recourse that is reliable for agents over time. Consequently, we argue that substantial additional work is needed to understand recourse reliability over time, and to develop recourse methods that reward agents’ effort. 

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5. Disentangling Influence: Using disentangled representations to audit model predictions.

   Marx, C. ; Phillips, R. ; Friedler, S.A. ; Scheidegger, C. ; Venkatasubramanian, S. ( January 2019 , Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS))

   Motivated by the need to audit complex and black box models, there has been extensive research on quantifying how data features influence model predictions. Feature influence can be direct (a direct influence on model outcomes) and indirect (model outcomes are influenced via proxy features). Feature influence can also be expressed in aggregate over the training or test data or locally with respect to a single point. Current research has typically focused on one of each of these dimensions. In this paper, we develop disentangled influence audits, a procedure to audit the indirect influence of features. Specifically, we show that disentangled representations provide a mechanism to identify proxy features in the dataset, while allowing an explicit computation of feature influence on either individual outcomes or aggregate-level outcomes. We show through both theory and experiments that disentangled influence audits can both detect proxy features and show, for each individual or in aggregate, which of these proxy features affects the classifier being audited the most. In this respect, our method is more powerful than existing methods for ascertaining feature influence. 

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