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Title: Post-Radiation Fault Analysis of a High Reliability FPGA Linux SoC
FPGAs are increasingly being used in space and other harsh radiation environments. However, SRAM-based FPGAs are susceptible to radiation in these environments and experience upsets within the configuration memory (CRAM), causing design failure. The effects of CRAM upsets can be mitigated using triple-modular redundancy and configuration scrubbing. This work investigates the reliability of a soft RISC-V SoC system executing the Linux operating system mitigated by TMR and configuration scrubbing. In particular, this paper analyzes the failures of this triplicated system observed at a high-energy neutron radiation experiment. Using a bitstream fault analysis tool, the failures of this system caused by CRAM upsets are traced back to the affected FPGA resource and design logic. This fault analysis identifies the interconnect and I/O as the most vulnerable FPGA resources and the DDR controller logic as the design logic most likely to cause a failure. By identifying the FPGA resources and design logic causing failures in this TMR system, additional design enhancements are proposed to create a more reliable design for harsh radiation environments.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1738550
PAR ID:
10442786
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ; ;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
Proceedings of the 2023 ACM/SIGDA International Symposium on Field Programmable Gate Arrays
Page Range / eLocation ID:
123 to 133
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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