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Title: WAS-Deletion: Workload-Aware Secure Deletion Scheme for Solid-State Drives
Due to the intrinsic properties of Solid-State Drives (SSDs), invalid data remain in SSDs before erased by a garbage collection process, which increases the risk of being attacked by adversaries. Previous studies use erase and cryptography based schemes to purposely delete target data but face extremely large overhead. In this paper, we propose a Workload-Aware Secure Deletion scheme, called WAS-Deletion, to reduce the overhead of secure deletion by three major components. First, the WASDeletion scheme efficiently splits invalid and valid data into different blocks based on workload characteristics. Second, the WAS-Deletion scheme uses a new encryption allocation scheme, making the encryption follow the same direction as the write on multiple blocks and vertically encrypts pages with the same key in one block. Finally, a new adaptive scheduling scheme can dynamically change the configurations of different regions to further reduce secure deletion overhead based on the current workload. The experimental results indicate that the newly proposed WAS-Deletion scheme can reduce the secure deletion cost by about 1.2x to 12.9x compared to previous studies.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1812537
NSF-PAR ID:
10446654
Author(s) / Creator(s):
;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
ICCD
Page Range / eLocation ID:
244 to 247
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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