Title: PCSPOOF: Compromising the Safety of Time-Triggered Ethernet
Designers are increasingly using mixed-criticality networks in embedded systems to reduce size, weight, power, and cost. Perhaps the most successful of these technologies is Time-Triggered Ethernet (TTE), which lets critical time-triggered (TT) traffic and non-critical best-effort (BE) traffic share the same switches and cabling. A key aspect of TTE is that the TT part of the system is isolated from the BE part, and thus BE devices have no way to disrupt the operation of the TTE devices. This isolation allows designers to: (1) use untrusted, but low cost, BE hardware, (2) lower BE security requirements, and (3) ignore BE devices during safety reviews and certification procedures.We present PCSPOOF, the first attack to break TTE’s isolation guarantees. PCSPOOF is based on two key observations. First, it is possible for a BE device to infer private information about the TT part of the network that can be used to craft malicious synchronization messages. Second, by injecting electrical noise into a TTE switch over an Ethernet cable, a BE device can trick the switch into sending these malicious synchronization messages to other TTE devices. Our evaluation shows that successful attacks are possible in seconds, and that each successful attack can cause TTE devices to lose synchronization for up to a second and drop tens of TT messages — both of which can result in the failure of critical systems like aircraft or automobiles. We also show that, in a simulated spaceflight mission, PCSPOOF causes uncontrolled maneuvers that threaten safety and mission success. We disclosed PCSPOOF to aerospace companies using TTE, and several are implementing mitigations from this paper.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1703936 1955670 1750158
PAR ID:
10453011
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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