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  1. Free, publicly-accessible full text available May 9, 2024
  2. Designers are increasingly using mixed-criticality networks in embedded systems to reduce size, weight, power, and cost. Perhaps the most successful of these technologies is Time-Triggered Ethernet (TTE), which lets critical time-triggered (TT) traffic and non-critical best-effort (BE) traffic share the same switches and cabling. A key aspect of TTE is that the TT part of the system is isolated from the BE part, and thus BE devices have no way to disrupt the operation of the TTE devices. This isolation allows designers to: (1) use untrusted, but low cost, BE hardware, (2) lower BE security requirements, and (3) ignore BE devices during safety reviews and certification procedures.We present PCSPOOF, the first attack to break TTE’s isolation guarantees. PCSPOOF is based on two key observations. First, it is possible for a BE device to infer private information about the TT part of the network that can be used to craft malicious synchronization messages. Second, by injecting electrical noise into a TTE switch over an Ethernet cable, a BE device can trick the switch into sending these malicious synchronization messages to other TTE devices. Our evaluation shows that successful attacks are possible in seconds, and that each successful attack can cause TTE devices to lose synchronization for up to a second and drop tens of TT messages — both of which can result in the failure of critical systems like aircraft or automobiles. We also show that, in a simulated spaceflight mission, PCSPOOF causes uncontrolled maneuvers that threaten safety and mission success. We disclosed PCSPOOF to aerospace companies using TTE, and several are implementing mitigations from this paper. 
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    Free, publicly-accessible full text available May 1, 2024
  3. When scheduling multi-mode real-time systems on multi-core platforms, a key question is how to dynamically adjust shared resources, such as cache and memory bandwidth, when resource demands change, without jeopardizing schedulability during mode changes. This paper presents Omni, a first end-to-end solution to this problem. Omni consists of a novel multi-mode resource allocation algorithm and a resource-aware schedulability test that supports general mode-change semantics as well as dynamic cache and bandwidth resource allocation. Omni's resource allocation leverages the platform's concurrency and the diversity of the tasks' demands to minimize overload during mode transitions; it does so by intelligently co-distributing tasks and resources across cores. Omni's schedulability test ensures predictable mode transitions, and it takes into account mode-change effects on the resource demands on different cores, so as to best match their dynamic needs using the available resources. We have implemented a prototype of Omni, and we have evaluated it using randomly generated multi-mode systems with several real-world benchmarks as the workload. Our results show that Omni has low overhead, and that it is substantially more effective in improving schedulability than the state of the art 
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