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ObjectiveThis study explores subjective and objective driving style similarity to identify how similarity can be used to develop driver-compatible vehicle automation. BackgroundSimilarity in the ways that interaction partners perform tasks can be measured subjectively, through questionnaires, or objectively by characterizing each agent’s actions. Although subjective measures have advantages in prediction, objective measures are more useful when operationalizing interventions based on these measures. Showing how objective and subjective similarity are related is therefore prudent for aligning future machine performance with human preferences. MethodsA driving simulator study was conducted with stop-and-go scenarios. Participants experienced conservative, moderate, and aggressive automated driving styles and rated the similarity between their own driving style and that of the automation. Objective similarity between the manual and automated driving speed profiles was calculated using three distance measures: dynamic time warping, Euclidean distance, and time alignment measure. Linear mixed effects models were used to examine how different components of the stopping profile and the three objective similarity measures predicted subjective similarity. ResultsObjective similarity using Euclidean distance best predicted subjective similarity. However, this was only observed for participants’ approach to the intersection and not their departure. ConclusionDeveloping driving styles that drivers perceive to be similar to their own is an important step toward driver-compatible automation. In determining what constitutes similarity, it is important to (a) use measures that reflect the driver’s perception of similarity, and (b) understand what elements of the driving style govern subjective similarity.
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Seeing the subjective as objective: People perceive the taste of those they disagree with as biased and wrong
Abstract People think that they see things as they are in “objective reality,” and they impute bias and other negative qualities to those who disagree. Evidence for these tendencies initially emerged in the domain of politics, where people tend to assume that there are objectively correct beliefs and positions. The present research shows that people are confident in the correctness of their views, and they negatively judge those who disagree, even in the seemingly “subjective” domain of art. Across seven experiments, participants evaluated paintings and encountered others who agreed or disagreed with their evaluations. Participants saw others' evaluations as less objective when they clashed with their own, and as more influenced by biasing factors like conformity or financial incentives. These aesthetic preferences felt as objective as political preferences. Reminding people of their belief that artistic preferences are “matters of opinion” reduced this thinking, but did not eliminate it. These findings suggest that people's convictions of their own objectivity are so powerful as to extend to domains that are typically regarded as “subjective.”
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- Award ID(s):
- 1655011
- PAR ID:
- 10453913
- Publisher / Repository:
- Wiley Blackwell (John Wiley & Sons)
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
- Volume:
- 34
- Issue:
- 2
- ISSN:
- 0894-3257
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- p. 167-182
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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