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Abstract Constraining the actions of AI systems is one promising way to ensure that these systems behave in a way that is morally acceptable to humans. But constraints alone come with drawbacks as in many AI systems, they are not flexible. If these constraints are too rigid, they can preclude actions that are actually acceptable in certain, contextual situations. Humans, on the other hand, can often decide when a simple and seemingly inflexible rule should actually be overridden based on the context. In this paper, we empirically investigate the way humans make these contextual moral judgements, with the goal of building AI systems that understand when to follow and when to override constraints. We propose a novel and general preference-based graphical model that captures a modification of standarddual processtheories of moral judgment. We then detail the design, implementation, and results of a study of human participants who judge whether it is acceptable to break a well-established rule:no cutting in line. We then develop an instance of our model and compare its performance to that of standard machine learning approaches on the task of predicting the behavior of human participants in the study, showing that our preference-based approach more accurately captures the judgments of human decision-makers. It also provides a flexible method to model the relationship between variables for moral decision-making tasks that can be generalized to other settings. 

We consider the problem of determining a binary ground truth using advice from a group of independent reviewers (experts) who express their guess about a ground truth correctly with some independent probability (competence) 𝑝 . In this setting, when all reviewers 𝑖 are competent with 𝑝 ≥ 0.5, the Condorcet Jury Theorem tells us that adding more reviewers increases the overall accuracy, and if all 𝑝 ’s are known, then there exists an optimal weighting of the 𝑖 reviewers. However, in practical settings, reviewers may be noisy or incompetent, i.e., 𝑝𝑖 ≤ 0.5, and the number of experts may be small, so the asymptotic Condorcet Jury Theorem is not practically relevant. In such cases we explore appointing one or more chairs ( judges) who determine the weight of each reviewer for aggregation, creating multiple levels. However, these chairs may be unable to correctly identify the competence of the reviewers they oversee, and therefore unable to compute the optimal weighting. We give conditions on when a set of chairs is able to weight the reviewers optimally, and depending on the competence distribution of the agents, give results about when it is better to have more chairs or more reviewers. Through simulations we show that in some cases it is better to have more chairs, but in many cases it is better to have more reviewers. 

Public sector leverages artificial intelligence (AI) to enhance the efficiency, transparency, and accountability of civic operations and public services. This includes initiatives such as predictive waste management, facial recognition for identification, and advanced tools in the criminal justice system. While public-sector AI can improve efficiency and accountability, it also has the potential to perpetuate biases, infringe on privacy, and marginalize vulnerable groups. Responsible AI (RAI) research aims to address these concerns by focusing on fairness and equity through participatory AI. We invite researchers, community members, and public sector workers to collaborate on designing, developing, and deploying RAI systems that enhance public sector accountability and transparency. Key topics include raising awareness of AI's impact on the public sector, improving access to AI auditing tools, building public engagement capacity, fostering early community involvement to align AI innovations with public needs, and promoting accessible and inclusive participation in AI development. The workshop will feature two keynotes, two short paper sessions, and three discussion-oriented activities. Our goal is to create a platform for exchanging ideas and developing strategies to design community-engaged RAI systems while mitigating the potential harms of AI and maximizing its benefits in the public sector. 

Commercial AI services can put proprietary data at risk — but there are alternatives. 

Nudging is a behavioral strategy aimed at influencing people’s thoughts and actions. Nudging techniques can be found in many situations in our daily lives, and these nudging techniques can targeted at human fast and unconscious thinking, e.g., by using images to generate fear or the more careful and effortful slow thinking, e.g., by releasing information that makes us reflect on our choices. In this paper, we propose and discuss a value-based AI-human collaborative framework where AI systems nudge humans by proposing decision recommendations. Three different nudging modalities, based on when recommendations are presented to the human, are intended to stimulate human fast thinking, slow thinking, or meta-cognition. Values that are relevant to a specific decision scenario are used to decide when and how to use each of these nudging modalities. Examples of values are decision quality, speed, human upskilling and learning, human agency, and privacy. Several values can be present at the same time, and their priorities can vary over time. The framework treats values as parameters to be instantiated in a specific decision environment. 

In representative democracies, regular election cycles are supposed to prevent misbehavior by elected officials, hold them accountable, and subject them to the “will of the people." Pandering, or dishonest preference reporting by candidates campaigning for election, undermines this democratic idea. Much of the work on Computational Social Choice to date has investigated strategic actions in only a single election. We introduce a novel formal model of pandering and examine the resilience of two voting systems, Representative Democracy (RD) and Flexible Representative Democracy (FRD), to pandering within a single election and across multiple rounds of elections. For both voting systems, our analysis centers on the types of strategies candidates employ and how voters update their views of candidates based on how the candidates have pandered in the past. We provide theoretical results on the complexity of pandering in our setting for a single election, formulate our problem for multiple cycles as a Markov Decision Process, and use reinforcement learning to study the effects of pandering by single candidates and groups of candidates over many rounds. 

Sometimes agents care not only about the outcomes of collective decisions but also about how decisions are made. Both the outcome and the procedure affect whether agents see a decision as legitimate or acceptable. We focus on incorporating agents’ preferences over decision-making processes into the process itself. Taking whole decisions, including decision rules and outcomes, to be the object of agent preferences rather than only decision outcomes, we (1) identify natural, plausible preference structures and key properties, (2) develop general mechanisms for aggregating these preferences to maximize the acceptability of decisions, and (3) analyze the performance of our acceptance-maximizing mechanisms. We apply our general approach to the setting of dichotomous choice, and compare the worst-case rates of acceptance achievable among populations of agents of different types. We include the special case of rule selection, or amendment, and show that amendment procedures proposed by Abramowitz et al. [2] achieve universal acceptance with certain agent types. 

When it comes to collective decisions, we have to deal with the fact that agents have preferences over both decision outcomes and how decisions are made. If we create rules for aggregating preferences over rules, and rules for preferences over rules for preferences over rules, and so on, it would appear that we run into infinite regress with preferences and rules at successively higher “levels.” The starting point of our analysis is the claim that such regress should not be a problem in practice, as any such preferences will necessarily be bounded in complexity and structured coherently in accordance with some (possibly latent) normative principles. Our core contributions are (1) the identification of simple, intuitive preference structures at low levels that can be generalized to form the building blocks of preferences at higher levels, and (2) the de- velopment of algorithms for maximizing the number of agents with such low-level preferences who will “accept” a decision. We analyze algorithms for acceptance maximization in two different domains: asymmetric dichotomous choice and constitutional amendment. In both settings we study the worst-case performance of the appro- priate algorithms, and reveal circumstances under which universal acceptance is possible. In particular, we show that constitutional amendment procedures proposed recently by Abramowitz et al. [2] can achieve universal acceptance. 

Many real-life scenarios require humans to make difficult trade-offs: do we always follow all the traffic rules or do we violate the speed limit in an emergency? In general, how should we account for and balance the ethical values, safety recommendations, and societal norms, when we are trying to achieve a certain objective? To enable effective AI-human collaboration, we must equip AI agents with a model of how humans make such trade-offs in environments where there is not only a goal to be reached, but there are also ethical constraints to be considered and to possibly align with. These ethical constraints could be both deontological rules on actions that should not be performed, or also consequentialist policies that recommend avoiding reaching certain states of the world. Our purpose is to build AI agents that can mimic human behavior in these ethically constrained decision environments, with a long term research goal to use AI to help humans in making better moral judgments and actions. To this end, we propose a computational approach where competing objectives and ethical constraints are orchestrated through a method that leverages a cognitive model of human decision making, called multi-alternative decision field theory (MDFT). Using MDFT, we build an orchestrator, called MDFT-Orchestrator (MDFT-O), that is both general and flexible. We also show experimentally that MDFT-O both generates better decisions than using a heuristic that takes a weighted average of competing policies (WA-O), but also performs better in terms of mimicking human decisions as collected through Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). Our methodology is therefore able to faithfully model human decision in ethically constrained decision environments.