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Many real-life scenarios require humans to make difficult trade-offs: do we always follow all the traffic rules or do we violate the speed limit in an emergency? In general, how should we account for and balance the ethical values, safety recommendations, and societal norms, when we are trying to achieve a certain objective? To enable effective AI-human collaboration, we must equip AI agents with a model of how humans make such trade-offs in environments where there is not only a goal to be reached, but there are also ethical constraints to be considered and to possibly align with. These ethical constraints could be both deontological rules on actions that should not be performed, or also consequentialist policies that recommend avoiding reaching certain states of the world. Our purpose is to build AI agents that can mimic human behavior in these ethically constrained decision environments, with a long term research goal to use AI to help humans in making better moral judgments and actions. To this end, we propose a computational approach where competing objectives and ethical constraints are orchestrated through a method that leverages a cognitive model of human decision making, called multi-alternative decision field theory (MDFT). Using MDFT, wemore »build an orchestrator, called MDFT-Orchestrator (MDFT-O), that is both general and flexible. We also show experimentally that MDFT-O both generates better decisions than using a heuristic that takes a weighted average of competing policies (WA-O), but also performs better in terms of mimicking human decisions as collected through Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). Our methodology is therefore able to faithfully model human decision in ethically constrained decision environments.« less

We propose a novel formulation of group fairness with biased feedback in the contextual multi-armed bandit (CMAB) setting. In the CMAB setting, a sequential decision maker must, at each time step, choose an arm to pull from a finite set of arms after observing some context for each of the potential arm pulls. In our model, arms are partitioned into two or more sensitive groups based on some protected feature(s) (e.g., age, race, or socio-economic status). Initial rewards received from pulling an arm may be distorted due to some unknown societal or measurement bias. We assume that in reality these groups are equal despite the biased feedback received by the agent. To alleviate this, we learn a societal bias term which can be used to both find the source of bias and to potentially fix the problem outside of the algorithm. We provide a novel algorithm that can accommodate this notion of fairness for an arbitrary number of groups, and provide a theoretical bound on the regret for our algorithm. We validate our algorithm using synthetic data and two real-world datasets for intervention settings wherein we want to allocate resources fairly across groups.

Aggregating signals from a collection of noisy sources is a fundamental problem in many domains including crowd-sourcing, multi-agent planning, sensor networks, signal processing, voting, ensemble learning, and federated learning. The core question is how to aggregate signals from multiple sources (e.g. experts) in order to reveal an underlying ground truth. While a full answer depends on the type of signal, correlation of signals, and desired output, a problem common to all of these applications is that of differentiating sources based on their quality and weighting them accordingly. It is often assumed that this differentiation and aggregation is done by a single, accurate central mechanism or agent (e.g. judge). We complicate this model in two ways. First, we investigate the setting with both a single judge, and one with multiple judges. Second, given this multi-agent interaction of judges, we investigate various constraints on the judges’ reporting space. We build on known results for the optimal weighting of experts and prove that an ensemble of sub-optimal mechanisms can perform optimally under certain conditions. We then show empirically that the ensemble approximates the performance of the optimal mechanism under a broader range of conditions.

We analyze the run-time complexity of computing allocations that are both fair and maximize the utilitarian social welfare, defined as the sum of agents’ utilities. We focus on two tractable fairness concepts: envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and proportionality up to one item (PROP1). We consider two computational problems: (1) Among the utilitarian-maximal allocations, decide whether there exists one that is also fair; (2) among the fair allocations, compute one that maximizes the utilitarian welfare. We show that both problems are strongly NP-hard when the number of agents is variable, and remain NP-hard for a fixed number of agents greater than two. For the special case of two agents, we find that problem (1) is polynomial-time solvable, while problem (2) remains NP-hard. Finally, with a fixed number of agents, we design pseudopolynomial-time algorithms for both problems. We extend our results to the stronger fairness notions envy-freeness up to any item (EFx) and proportionality up to any item (PROPx).

Current AI systems lack several important human capabilities, such as adaptability, generalizability, selfcontrol, consistency, common sense, and causal reasoning. We believe that existing cognitive theories of human decision making, such as the thinking fast and slow theory, can provide insights on how to advance AI systems towards some of these capabilities. In this paper, we propose a general architecture that is based on fast/slow solvers and a metacognitive component. We then present experimental results on the behavior of an instance of this architecture, for AI systems that make decisions about navigating in a constrained environment. We show how combining the fast and slow decision modalities, which can be implemented by learning and reasoning components respectively, allows the system to evolve over time and gradually pass from slow to fast thinking with enough experience, and that this greatly helps in decision quality, resource consumption, and efficiency.

The stable marriage problem (SMP) is a mathematical abstraction of two-sided matching markets with many practical applications including matching resident doctors to hospitals and students to schools. Several preference models have been considered in the context of SMPs including orders with ties, incomplete orders, and orders with uncertainty, but none have yet captured behavioral aspects of human decision making, e.g., contextual effects of choice. We introduce Behavioral Stable Marriage Problems (BSMPs), bringing together the formalism of matching with cognitive models of decision making to account for multi-attribute, non-deterministic preferences and to study the impact of well known behavioral deviations from rationality on two core notions of SMPs: stability and fairness. We analyze the computational complexity of BSMPs and show that proposal-based approaches are affected by contextual effects. We then propose and evaluate novel ILP and local-search-based methods to efficiently find optimally stable and fair matchings for BSMPs.

The stable marriage problem (SMP) is a mathematical abstraction of two-sided matching markets with many practical applications including matching resident doctors to hospitals and students to schools. Several preference models have been considered in the context of SMPs including orders with ties, incomplete orders, and orders with uncertainty, but none have yet captured behavioral aspects of human decision making, e.g., contextual effects of choice. We introduce Behavioral Stable Marriage Problems (BSMPs), bringing together the formalism of matching with cognitive models of decision making to account for multi-attribute, non-deterministic preferences and to study the impact of well known behavioral deviations from rationality on two core notions of SMPs: stability and fairness. We analyze the computational complexity of BSMPs and show that proposal-based approaches are affected by contextual effects. We then propose and evaluate novel ILP and local-search-based methods to efficiently find optimally stable and fair matchings for BSMPs.

In many real world situations, collective decisions are made using voting and, in scenarios such as committee or board elections, employing voting rules that return multiple winners. In multi-winner approval voting (AV), an agent submits a ballot consisting of approvals for as many candidates as they wish, and winners are chosen by tallying up the votes and choosing the top-k candidates receiving the most approvals. In many scenarios, an agent may manipulate the ballot they submit in order to achieve a better outcome by voting in a way that does not reflect their true preferences. In complex and uncertain situations, agents may use heuristics instead of incurring the additional effort required to compute the manipulation which most favors them. In this paper, we examine voting behavior in single-winner and multi-winner approval voting scenarios with varying degrees of uncertainty using behavioral data obtained from Mechanical Turk. We find that people generally manipulate their vote to obtain a better outcome, but often do not identify the optimal manipulation. There are a number of predictive models of agent behavior in the social choice and psychology literature that are based on cognitively plausible heuristic strategies. We show that the existing approaches do not adequatelymore »model our real-world data. We propose a novel model that takes into account the size of the winning set and human cognitive constraints; and demonstrate that this model is more effective at capturing real-world behaviors in multi-winner approval voting scenarios.« less

Many real-life scenarios require humans to make difficult trade-offs: do we always follow all the traffic rules or do we violate the speed limit in an emergency? These scenarios force us to evaluate the trade-off between collective norms and our own personal objectives. To create effective AI-human teams, we must equip AI agents with a model of how humans make trade-offs in complex, constrained environments. These agents will be able to mirror human behavior or to draw human attention to situations where decision making could be improved. To this end, we propose a novel inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) method for learning implicit hard and soft constraints from demonstrations, enabling agents to quickly adapt to new settings. In addition, learning soft constraints over states, actions, and state features allows agents to transfer this knowledge to new domains that share similar aspects.