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1. Do Honey Bees (Apis mellifera) Form Cognitive Representations of Unconditioned Stimuli?

   https://doi.org/10.46867/ijcp.2020.33.00.02  

   Stauch, Kiri Li ; Wells, Harrington ; Abramson, Charles I. ( January 2020 , International Journal of Comparative Psychology)

   Previous research looking at expectancy in animals has used various experimental designs focusing on appetitive and avoidance behaviors. In this study, honey bees (Apis mellifera) were tested ina series of three proboscis extension response (PER) experiments to determine to what degree honey bees’ form a cognitive-representation of an unconditioned stimulus (US). Tthe first experiment, bees were presented with either a 2 sec. sucrose US or 2 sec. honey US appetitive reward and the proboscis-extension duration was measured under each scenario. The PER duration was longer for the honey US even though each US was presented for just 2 sec. Honey bees in the second experiment were tested during extinction trials on a conditioned stimulus (CS) of cinnamon or lavender that was paired with either the sucrose US or honey US in the acquisition trials. The proportion of bees showing the PER response to the CS was recorded for each extinction trial for each US scenario, as was the duration of the proboscis extension for each bee. Neither measure differed between the honey US and sucrose US scenarios, In experiment three, bees were presented with a cinnamon or lavender CS paired with either honey US or sucrose US in a set of acquisition trials, but here the US was not given until after the proboscis was retracted. The PER duration after the CS, and again subsequent after the US, were recorded. While the PER duration after the US was longer for honey, the PER duration after the CS did not differ between honey US and sucrose US. 

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2. Appetitive reversal learning differences of two honey bee subspecies with different foraging behaviors

   https://doi.org/10.7717/peerj.5918  

   Pérez Claudio, Eddie ; Rodriguez-Cruz, Yoselyn ; Arslan, Okan Can ; Giray, Tugrul ; Agosto Rivera, José Luis ; Kence, Meral ; Wells, Harrington ; Abramson, Charles I. ( January 2018 , PeerJ)

   We aimed to examine mechanistically the observed foraging differences across two honey bee, Apis mellifera , subspecies using the proboscis extension response assay. Specifically, we compared differences in appetitive reversal learning ability between honey bee subspecies: Apis mellifera caucasica (Pollman), and Apis mellifera syriaca (Skorikov) in a “common garden” apiary. It was hypothesized that specific learning differences could explain previously observed foraging behavior differences of these subspecies: A.m. caucasica switches between different flower color morphs in response to reward variability, and A.m. syriaca does not switch. We suggest that flower constancy allows reduced exposure by minimizing search and handling time, whereas plasticity is important when maximizing harvest in preparation for long winter is at a premium. In the initial or Acquisition phase of the test we examined specifically discrimination learning, where bees were trained to respond to a paired conditioned stimulus with an unconditioned stimulus and not to respond to a second conditioned stimulus that is not followed by an unconditioned stimulus. We found no significant differences among the subspecies in the Acquisition phase in appetitive learning. During the second, Reversal phase of the experiment, where flexibility in association was tested, the paired and unpaired conditioned stimuli were reversed. During the Reversal phase A.m. syriaca showed a reduced ability to learn the reverse association in the appetitive learning task. This observation is consistent with the hypothesis that A.m. syriaca foragers cannot change the foraging choice because of lack of flexibility in appetitive associations under changing contingencies. Interestingly, both subspecies continued responding to the previously rewarded conditioned stimulus in the reversal phase. We discuss potential ecological correlates and molecular underpinnings of these differences in learning across the two subspecies. In addition, in a supplemental experiment we demonstrated that these differences in appetitive reversal learning do not occur in other learning contexts. 

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3. Label-based expectations affect incentive contrast effects in bumblebees

   https://doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2021.0549  

   Hemingway, Claire T. ; Muth, Felicity ( March 2022 , Biology Letters)

   While classic models of animal decision-making assume that individuals assess the absolute value of options, decades of research have shown that rewards are often evaluated relative to recent experience, creating incentive contrast effects. Contrast effects are often assumed to be purely sensory, yet consumer and experimental psychology tell us that label-based expectations can affect value perception in humans and rodents. However, this has rarely been tested in non-model systems. Bumblebees forage on a variety of flowers that vary in their signals and rewards and show contrast when rewards are lowered. We manipulated bees' expectations of stimulus quality, before downshifting the reward to induce incentive contrast. We found that contrast effects were not solely driven by experience with a better reward, but also influenced by experience with associated stimuli. While bees' initial response did not differ between treatments, individuals were faster to accept the lower-quality reward when it was paired with a novel stimulus. We explored the boundaries of these label-based expectations by testing bees along a stimulus gradient and found that expectations generalized to similar stimuli. Such reference-dependent evaluations may play an important role in bees' foraging choices, with the potential to impact floral evolution and plant community dynamics. 

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4. The Effects of Gist Information and Scientific Quality on Damages in a Civil Trial

   Dellapaolera, K.S. ( March 2020 , Annual Conference of the American Psychology-Law Society.)

   Abstract: 100 words Jurors are increasingly exposed to scientific information in the courtroom. To determine whether providing jurors with gist information would assist in their ability to make well-informed decisions, the present experiment utilized a Fuzzy Trace Theory-inspired intervention and tested it against traditional legal safeguards (i.e., judge instructions) by varying the scientific quality of the evidence. The results indicate that jurors who viewed high quality evidence rated the scientific evidence significantly higher than those who viewed low quality evidence, but were unable to moderate the credibility of the expert witness and apply damages appropriately resulting in poor calibration. Summary: <1000 words Jurors and juries are increasingly exposed to scientific information in the courtroom and it remains unclear when they will base their decisions on a reasonable understanding of the relevant scientific information. Without such knowledge, the ability of jurors and juries to make well-informed decisions may be at risk, increasing chances of unjust outcomes (e.g., false convictions in criminal cases). Therefore, there is a critical need to understand conditions that affect jurors’ and juries’ sensitivity to the qualities of scientific information and to identify safeguards that can assist with scientific calibration in the courtroom. The current project addresses these issues with an ecologically valid experimental paradigm, making it possible to assess causal effects of evidence quality and safeguards as well as the role of a host of individual difference variables that may affect perceptions of testimony by scientific experts as well as liability in a civil case. Our main goal was to develop a simple, theoretically grounded tool to enable triers of fact (individual jurors) with a range of scientific reasoning abilities to appropriately weigh scientific evidence in court. We did so by testing a Fuzzy Trace Theory-inspired intervention in court, and testing it against traditional legal safeguards. Appropriate use of scientific evidence reflects good calibration – which we define as being influenced more by strong scientific information than by weak scientific information. Inappropriate use reflects poor calibration – defined as relative insensitivity to the strength of scientific information. Fuzzy Trace Theory (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995) predicts that techniques for improving calibration can come from presentation of easy-to-interpret, bottom-line “gist” of the information. Our central hypothesis was that laypeople’s appropriate use of scientific information would be moderated both by external situational conditions (e.g., quality of the scientific information itself, a decision aid designed to convey clearly the “gist” of the information) and individual differences among people (e.g., scientific reasoning skills, cognitive reflection tendencies, numeracy, need for cognition, attitudes toward and trust in science). Identifying factors that promote jurors’ appropriate understanding of and reliance on scientific information will contribute to general theories of reasoning based on scientific evidence, while also providing an evidence-based framework for improving the courts’ use of scientific information. All hypotheses were preregistered on the Open Science Framework. Method Participants completed six questionnaires (counterbalanced): Need for Cognition Scale (NCS; 18 items), Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; 7 items), Abbreviated Numeracy Scale (ABS; 6 items), Scientific Reasoning Scale (SRS; 11 items), Trust in Science (TIS; 29 items), and Attitudes towards Science (ATS; 7 items). Participants then viewed a video depicting a civil trial in which the defendant sought damages from the plaintiff for injuries caused by a fall. The defendant (bar patron) alleged that the plaintiff (bartender) pushed him, causing him to fall and hit his head on the hard floor. Participants were informed at the outset that the defendant was liable; therefore, their task was to determine if the plaintiff should be compensated. Participants were randomly assigned to 1 of 6 experimental conditions: 2 (quality of scientific evidence: high vs. low) x 3 (safeguard to improve calibration: gist information, no-gist information [control], jury instructions). An expert witness (neuroscientist) hired by the court testified regarding the scientific strength of fMRI data (high [90 to 10 signal-to-noise ratio] vs. low [50 to 50 signal-to-noise ratio]) and gist or no-gist information both verbally (i.e., fairly high/about average) and visually (i.e., a graph). After viewing the video, participants were asked if they would like to award damages. If they indicated yes, they were asked to enter a dollar amount. Participants then completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule-Modified Short Form (PANAS-MSF; 16 items), expert Witness Credibility Scale (WCS; 20 items), Witness Credibility and Influence on damages for each witness, manipulation check questions, Understanding Scientific Testimony (UST; 10 items), and 3 additional measures were collected, but are beyond the scope of the current investigation. Finally, participants completed demographic questions, including questions about their scientific background and experience. The study was completed via Qualtrics, with participation from students (online vs. in-lab), MTurkers, and non-student community members. After removing those who failed attention check questions, 469 participants remained (243 men, 224 women, 2 did not specify gender) from a variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds (70.2% White, non-Hispanic). Results and Discussion There were three primary outcomes: quality of the scientific evidence, expert credibility (WCS), and damages. During initial analyses, each dependent variable was submitted to a separate 3 Gist Safeguard (safeguard, no safeguard, judge instructions) x 2 Scientific Quality (high, low) Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). Consistent with hypotheses, there was a significant main effect of scientific quality on strength of evidence, F(1, 463)=5.099, p=.024; participants who viewed the high quality evidence rated the scientific evidence significantly higher (M= 7.44) than those who viewed the low quality evidence (M=7.06). There were no significant main effects or interactions for witness credibility, indicating that the expert that provided scientific testimony was seen as equally credible regardless of scientific quality or gist safeguard. Finally, for damages, consistent with hypotheses, there was a marginally significant interaction between Gist Safeguard and Scientific Quality, F(2, 273)=2.916, p=.056. However, post hoc t-tests revealed significantly higher damages were awarded for low (M=11.50) versus high (M=10.51) scientific quality evidence F(1, 273)=3.955, p=.048 in the no gist with judge instructions safeguard condition, which was contrary to hypotheses. The data suggest that the judge instructions alone are reversing the pattern, though nonsignificant, those who received the no gist without judge instructions safeguard awarded higher damages in the high (M=11.34) versus low (M=10.84) scientific quality evidence conditions F(1, 273)=1.059, p=.30. Together, these provide promising initial results indicating that participants were able to effectively differentiate between high and low scientific quality of evidence, though inappropriately utilized the scientific evidence through their inability to discern expert credibility and apply damages, resulting in poor calibration. These results will provide the basis for more sophisticated analyses including higher order interactions with individual differences (e.g., need for cognition) as well as tests of mediation using path analyses. [References omitted but available by request] Learning Objective: Participants will be able to determine whether providing jurors with gist information would assist in their ability to award damages in a civil trial. 

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5. Spring Break or Heart Break? Extending Valence Bias to Emotional Words

   https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550620972296  

   Harp, Nicholas R. ; Brown, Catherine C. ; Neta, Maital ( November 2020 , Social Psychological and Personality Science)

   null (Ed.)

   Ambiguous stimuli are useful for assessing emotional bias. For example, surprised faces could convey a positive or negative meaning, and the degree to which an individual interprets these expressions as positive or negative represents their “valence bias.” Currently, the most well-validated ambiguous stimuli for assessing valence bias include nonverbal signals (faces and scenes), overlooking an inherent ambiguity in verbal signals. This study identified 32 words with dual-valence ambiguity (i.e., relatively high intersubject variability in valence ratings and relatively slow response times) and length-matched clearly valenced words (16 positive, 16 negative). Preregistered analyses demonstrated that the words-based valence bias correlated with the bias for faces, r s (213) = .27, p < .001, and scenes, r s (204) = .46, p < .001. That is, the same people who interpret ambiguous faces/scenes as positive also interpret ambiguous words as positive. These findings provide a novel tool for measuring valence bias and greater generalizability, resulting in a more robust measure of this bias. 

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