Caller-ID spoofing deceives the callee into believing a call is originating from another user. Spoofing has been strategically used in the now-pervasive telephone fraud, causing substantial monetary loss and sensitive data leakage. Unfortunately, caller-ID spoofing is feasible even when user authentication is in place. State-of-the-art solutions either exhibit high overhead or require extensive upgrades, and thus are unlikely to be deployed in the near future. In this paper, we seek an effective and efficient solution for 4G (and conceptually 5G) carrier networks to detect (and block) caller-ID spoofing. Specifically, we propose Nascent, Network-assisted caller ID authentication, to validate the caller-ID used during call setup which may not match the previously-authenticated ID. Nascent functionality is split between data-plane gateways and call control session functions. By leveraging existing communication interfaces between the two and authentication data already available at the gateways, Nascent only requires small, standard-compatible patches to the existing 4G infrastructure. We prototype and experimentally evaluate three variants of Nascent in traditional and Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) deployments. We demonstrate that Nascent significantly reduces overhead compared to the state-of-the-art, without sacrificing effectiveness.
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UCBlocker: Unwanted Call Blocking Using Anonymous Authentication
Telephone users are receiving more and more unwanted calls including spam and scam calls because of the transfer-without-verification nature of global telephone networks, which allows anyone to call any other numbers. To avoid unwanted calls, telephone users often ignore or block all incoming calls from unknown numbers, resulting in the missing of legitimate calls from new callers. This paper takes an end-to-end perspective to present a solution to block unwanted calls while allowing users to define the policies of acceptable calls. The proposed solution involves a new infrastructure based on anonymous credentials, which enables anonymous caller authentication and policy definition. Our design decouples caller authentication and call session initiation and introduces a verification code to interface and bind the two processes. This design minimizes changes to telephone networks, reduces latency to call initiation, and eliminates the need for a call-time data channel. A prototype of the system is implemented to evaluate its feasibility.
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- Award ID(s):
- 2247561
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10499282
- Publisher / Repository:
- USENIX Association
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- 32nd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 23)
- ISBN:
- 978-1-939133-37-3
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 445-462
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Location:
- Anaheim, CA, USA
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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