The Bitcoin scalability problem has led to the development of offchain
financial mechanisms such as payment channel networks
(PCNs) which help users process transactions of varying amounts,
including micro-payment transactions, without writing each transaction
to the blockchain. Since PCNs only allow path-based transactions,
effective, secure routing protocols that find a path between
a sender and receiver are fundamental to PCN operations. In this
paper, we propose RACED, a routing protocol that leverages the
idea of Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs) to route transactions in
PCNs in a fast and secure way. Our experiments on real-world
transaction datasets show that RACED gives an average transaction
success ratio of 98.74%, an average pathfinding time of 31.242
seconds, which is 1.65 × 103, 1.8 × 103, and 4 × 102 times faster
than three other recent routing protocols that offer comparable
security/privacy properties. We rigorously analyze and prove the
security of RACED in the Universal Composability framework.
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This content will become publicly available on July 1, 2025
Auroch: Auction based Multipath Routing for Payment Channel Networks
The Bitcoin blockchain scalability problem has inspired several offchain
solutions for enabling cryptocurrency transactions, of which
Layer-2 systems such as payment channel networks (PCNs) have
emerged as a frontrunner. PCNs allow for path-based transactions
between users without the need to access the blockchain. These
path-based transactions are possible only if a suitable path exists
from the sender of a payment to the receiver. In this paper, we propose
Auroch, a distributed auction-based pathfinding and routing
protocol that takes into account the routing fees charged by nodes
along a path. Unlike other routing protocols proposed for PCNs,
Auroch takes routing fees into consideration. Auroch maximizes the
profit that can be achieved by an intermediate node at the same
time minimizing the overall payment cost for the sender.
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- Award ID(s):
- 2148358
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10502892
- Publisher / Repository:
- ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM AsiaCCS)
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM AsiaCCS)
- Subject(s) / Keyword(s):
- Payment channel networks Auction Blockchains.
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Location:
- Singapore
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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