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  • Generalized Nash equilibrium models for asymmetric, non-cooperative games on line graphs: Application to water resource systems
Title: Generalized Nash equilibrium models for asymmetric, non-cooperative games on line graphs: Application to water resource systems
This paper investigates the game theory of resource-allocation situations where the ‘‘first come, first serve’’ heuristic creates inequitable, asymmetric benefits to the players. Specifically, this problem is formulated as a Generalized Nash Equilibrium Model where the players are arranged sequentially along a directed line graph. The goal of the model is to reduce the asymmetric benefits among the players using a policy instrument. It serves as a more realistic, alternative approach to the line-graph models considered in the cooperative game-theoretic literature. An application-oriented formulation is also developed for water resource systems. The players in this model are utilities who withdraw water and are arranged along a river basin from upstream to downstream. This model is applied to a stylized, three-node model as well as a test bed in the Duck River Basin in Tennessee, USA. Based on the results, a non-cooperative, water-release market can be an acceptable policy instrument according to metrics traditionally used in cooperative game theory.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
2113891
PAR ID:
10504215
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ;
Publisher / Repository:
Elsevier
Date Published:
Journal Name:
Computers & Operations Research
Volume:
154
Issue:
C
ISSN:
0305-0548
Page Range / eLocation ID:
106194
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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