This content will become publicly available on April 9, 2025
In the permutation inversion problem, the task is to find the preimage of some challenge value, given oracle access to the permutation. This fundamental problem in query complexity appears in many contexts, particularly cryptography. In this work, we examine the setting in which the oracle allows for quantum queries to both the forward and the inverse direction of the permutation—except that the challenge value cannot be submitted to the latter. Within that setting, we consider three options for the inversion algorithm: whether it can get quantum advice about the permutation, whether the query algorithm can restrict the distribution with which the challenge input is sampled, and whether it must produce the entire preimage (search) or only the first bit (decision). We prove several theorems connecting the hardness of the resulting variations of the permutation inversion problem and establish lower bounds for them. Our results show that, perhaps surprisingly, the permutation inversion problem does not become significantly easier when the adversary is granted oracle access to the inverse—provided it cannot query the challenge itself.
more » « less- Award ID(s):
- 2154705
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10510031
- Publisher / Repository:
- IACR
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Volume:
- 1
- Issue:
- 1
- ISSN:
- 3006-5496
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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