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Consider an algorithm performing a computation on a huge random object. Is it necessary to generate the entire object up front, or is it possible to provide query access to the object and sample it incrementally "on-the-fly"? Such an implementation should emulate the object by answering queries in a manner consistent with a random instance sampled from the true distribution. Our first set of results focus on undirected graphs with independent edge probabilities, under certain assumptions. Then, we use this to obtain the first efficient implementations for the Erdos-Renyi model and the Stochastic Block model. As in previous local-access implementations for random graphs, we support Vertex-Pair and Next-Neighbor queries. We also introduce a new Random-Neighbor query. Next, we show how to implement random Catalan objects, specifically focusing on Dyck paths (always positive random walks on the integer line). Here, we support Height queries to find the position of the walk, and First-Return queries to find the time when the walk returns to a specified height. This in turn can be used to implement Next-Neighbor queries on random rooted/binary trees, and Matching-Bracket queries on random well bracketed expressions. Finally, we define a new model that: (1) allows multiple independent simultaneous instantiations of the same implementation to be consistent with each other without communication (2) allows us to generate a richer class of random objects that do not have a succinct description. Specifically, we study uniformly random valid q-colorings of an input graph G with max degree Δ. The distribution over valid colorings is specified via a "huge" underlying graph G, that is far too large to be read in sub-linear time. Instead, we access G through local neighborhood probes. We are able to answer queries to the color of any vertex in sub-linear time for q>9Δ.
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Fraud Detection for Random Walks
Traditional fraud detection is often based on finding statistical anomalies in data sets and transaction histories. A sophisticated fraudster, aware of the exact kinds of tests being deployed, might be difficult or impossible to catch. We are interested in paradigms for fraud detection that are provably robust against any adversary, no matter how sophisticated. In other words, the detection strategy should rely on signals in the data that are inherent in the goals the adversary is trying to achieve. Specifically, we consider a fraud detection game centered on a random walk on a graph. We assume this random walk is implemented by having a player at each vertex, who can be honest or not. In particular, when the random walk reaches a vertex owned by an honest player, it proceeds to a uniformly random neighbor at the next timestep. However, when the random walk reaches a dishonest player, it instead proceeds to an arbitrary neighbor chosen by an omniscient Adversary. The game is played between the Adversary and a Referee who sees the trajectory of the random walk. At any point during the random walk, if the Referee determines that a {specific} vertex is controlled by a dishonest player, the Referee accuses that player, and therefore wins the game. The Referee is allowed to make the occasional incorrect accusation, but must follow a policy that makes such mistakes with small probability of error. The goal of the adversary is to make the cover time large, ideally infinite, i.e., the walk should never reach at least one vertex. We consider the following basic question: how much can the omniscient Adversary delay the cover time without getting caught? Our main result is a tight upper bound on this delay factor. We also discuss possible applications of our results to settings such as Rotor Walks, Leader Election, and Sybil Defense.
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- Award ID(s):
- 2221980
- PAR ID:
- 10522114
- Editor(s):
- Guruswami, Venkatesan
- Publisher / Repository:
- Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
- Date Published:
- Volume:
- 287
- ISSN:
- 1868-8969
- ISBN:
- 978-3-95977-309-6
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 287-287
- Subject(s) / Keyword(s):
- Fraud detection random processes Markov chains Theory of computation → Random walks and Markov chains Mathematics of computing → Probability and statistics Security and privacy → Intrusion detection systems
- Format(s):
- Medium: X Size: 22 pages; 810263 bytes Other: application/pdf
- Size(s):
- 22 pages 810263 bytes
- Right(s):
- Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license; info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
-
Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Conference Paper:
- https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2024.36
