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Title: Comparing experimental auctions and real choice experiments in food choice: a homegrown and induced value analysis
Abstract This study compares a real choice experiment (RCE) with three commonly used experimental auction (EA) mechanisms (Becker–DeGroot–Marschak, random nth price auction (RNPA), second price auction (SPA)) to determine whether willingness to pay (WTP) estimates differ across these elicitation methods. We use quality labels on eggs as the empirical application and find that the SPA, RNPA and RCE yield similar WTP estimates, while the BDM mechanism generally produces higher WTP estimates. We also compare these EAs and the RCE in an induced value setting and find that the BDM auction produces greater deviations from the underlying value than the other EAs and RCE. We suggest that RCEs may be preferable to BDMs for collecting WTP estimates in logistically difficult experimental settings.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1828942
PAR ID:
10536024
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ;
Publisher / Repository:
Oxford University Press
Date Published:
Journal Name:
European Review of Agricultural Economics
Volume:
50
Issue:
5
ISSN:
0165-1587
Page Range / eLocation ID:
1796 to 1823
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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