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Title: Resource Augmentation Analysis of the Greedy Algorithm for the Online Transportation Problem
We consider the online transportation problem set in a metric space containing parking garages of various capacities. Cars arrive over time, and must be assigned to an unfull parking garage upon their arrival. The objective is to minimize the aggregate distance that cars have to travel to their assigned parking garage. We show that the natural greedy algorithm, augmented with garages of k ≥ 3 times the capacity, is (1 + 2/k-2)-competitive.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1907673
PAR ID:
10549021
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ;
Publisher / Repository:
Springer
Date Published:
Journal Name:
International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications
Volume:
223
Issue:
C
ISSN:
1877-0509
Page Range / eLocation ID:
121 to 129
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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