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Title: BFTGym: An Interactive Playground for BFT Protocols
Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) protocols serve as a fundamental yet intricate component of distributed data management systems in untrustworthy environments. BFT protocols exhibit different design principles and performance characteristics under varying workloads and fault scenarios. The proliferation of BFT protocols and their growing complexity have made it increasingly challenging to analyze the performance and possible application scenarios of each protocol. This demonstration showcasesBFTGym, an interactive platform that allows audience members to (1) evaluate, compare, and gather insights into the performance of various BFT protocols under a wide range of conditions, and (2) prototype new BFT protocols rapidly.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
2104882
PAR ID:
10562690
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ; ;
Publisher / Repository:
VLDB
Date Published:
Journal Name:
Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment
Volume:
17
Issue:
12
ISSN:
2150-8097
Page Range / eLocation ID:
4261 to 4264
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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