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Abstract People respond quickly when they have a clear preference and slowly when they are close to indifference. The question is whether others exploit this tendency to infer private information. In two-stage bargaining experiments, we observe that the speed with which buyers reject sellers’ offers decreases with the size of the foregone surplus. This should allow sellers to infer buyers’ values from response times (RT), creating an incentive for buyers to manipulate their RT. We experimentally identify distinct conditions under which subjects do, and do not, exhibit such strategic behaviour. These results provide the first insight into the possible use of RT as a strategic variable.
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Deliberation during online bargaining reveals strategic information
A standard assumption in game theory is that decision-makers have preplanned strategies telling them what actions to take for every contingency. In contrast, nonstrategic decisions often involve an on-the-spot comparison process, with longer response times (RT) for choices between more similarly appealing options. If strategic decisions also exhibit these patterns, then RT might betray private information and alter game theory predictions. Here, we examined bargaining behavior to determine whether RT reveals private information in strategic settings. Using preexisting and experimental data from eBay, we show that both buyers and sellers take hours longer to accept bad offers and to reject good offers. We find nearly identical patterns in the two datasets, indicating a causal effect of offer size on RT. However, this relationship is half as strong for rejections as for acceptances, reducing the amount of useful private information revealed by the sellers. Counter to our predictions, buyers are discouraged by slow rejections—they are less likely to counteroffer to slow sellers. We also show that a drift-diffusion model (DDM), traditionally limited to decisions on the order of seconds, can account for decisions on the order of hours, sometimes days. The DDM reveals that more experienced sellers are less cautious and more inclined to accept offers. In summary, strategic decisions are inconsistent with preplanned strategies. This underscores the need for game theory to incorporate RT as a strategic variable and broadens the applicability of the DDM to slow decisions.
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- Award ID(s):
- 2333979
- PAR ID:
- 10571715
- Publisher / Repository:
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Volume:
- 122
- Issue:
- 7
- ISSN:
- 0027-8424
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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