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This content will become publicly available on February 20, 2026

Title: Signed, Sealed, Counted? An Experimental Study of Mail-in Ballot Signature Verification
Trust in elections is paramount for a democracy and citizens are more likely to cast ballots and support election results when they perceive election processes as trustworthy. However, with the advent of greater dependence on algorithms in election processes, we ask does a reliance on algorithms or a hybrid system for verifying signatures allay or increase citizens’ confidence in using them in elections? To answer this, we use unique survey experiments to first determine respondents’ comfort level in using such systems in elections and then to assess the circumstances which bound this trust. We find that respondents similarly trust automated and non-automated systems, but do not have a clear conception of the confidence threshold, set by policymakers, necessary for rejecting ballots. Additionally, respondents blame election officials more than algorithms when mistakes are made, although this result is contingent on the type of error and respondents’ partisanship. These results have significant implications for confidence in signature verification and other election processes that rely on artificial intelligence.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
2131504
PAR ID:
10572745
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ;
Publisher / Repository:
SAGE Publications
Date Published:
Journal Name:
Political Research Quarterly
Volume:
78
Issue:
3
ISSN:
1065-9129
Format(s):
Medium: X Size: p. 819-833
Size(s):
p. 819-833
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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