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Title: Pocketbook Voting in a Polarized Era: Economic Vulnerability and Anti-incumbent Voting in Presidential Elections
Abstract Economic circumstances and vote choice have long been shown to be closely linked, but increasing partisan polarization may be weakening this traditional relationship. We examine whether pocketbook voting – the tendency to vote based on personal economic circumstances – still influences presidential vote choice in this polarized era. Using the Cooperative Election Study’s data from 2020 to 2024, we explore how different indicators of economic vulnerability affect support for incumbent presidential candidates. We find that while partisans remain largely loyal except when suffering the most difficult economic hardships, independent voters show strong anti-incumbent voting when they experience financial strains. Our findings suggest that personal economic circumstances remain influential in American elections, but primarily among voters without strong partisan attachments.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
2342506
PAR ID:
10613823
Author(s) / Creator(s):
;
Publisher / Repository:
DeGruyter
Date Published:
Journal Name:
The Forum
Volume:
22
Issue:
2-3
ISSN:
1540-8884
Page Range / eLocation ID:
325 to 341
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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