Integrity of elections is vital to democratic systems, but it is frequently threatened by malicious actors. The study of algorithmic complexity of the problem of manipulating election outcomes by changing its structural features is known as election control. One means of election control that has been proposed is to select a subset of issues that determine voter preferences over candidates. We study a variation of this model in which voters have judgments about relative importance of issues, and a malicious actor can manipulate these judgments. We show that computing effective manipulations in this model is NP-hard even with two candidates or binary issues. However, we demonstrate that the problem is tractable with a constant number of voters or issues. Additionally, while it remains intractable when voters can vote stochastically, we exhibit an important special case in which stochastic voting enables tractable manipulation.
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This content will become publicly available on October 1, 2024
Voting Against Autocracy
When and how do voters punish politicians for subverting democracy? To investigate the role of the public in democratic backsliding, I develop a conceptual framework that differentiates among three mechanisms: vote switching, backlash, and disengagement. The first mechanism entails defection by voters from a candidate who undermines democracy to one who does not; the latter two mechanisms entail transitions between voting and abstention. I estimate the magnitude of each mechanism by combining evidence from a series of original survey experiments, traditional surveys, and a quasi-experiment afforded by the rerun of the 2019 Istanbul mayoral election, in which the governing party, akp, attempted to overturn the result of an election that it had lost. I find that although vote switching and backlash contributed to the akp's eventual defeat the most, each of the three mechanisms served as a democratic check in some subset of the Istanbul electorate. Persuasion, mobilization, and even demobilization are all viable tools for curbing the authoritarian tendencies of elected politicians.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1851524
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10484160
- Publisher / Repository:
- Johns Hopkins University Press
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- World Politics
- Volume:
- 75
- Issue:
- 4
- ISSN:
- 1086-3338
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 647 to 691
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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