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Abstract During visually guided behavior, the prefrontal cortex plays a pivotal role in mapping sensory inputs onto appropriate motor plans. When the sensory input is ambiguous, this involves deliberation. It is not known whether the deliberation is implemented as a competition between possible stimulus interpretations or between possible motor plans. Here we study neural population activity in the prefrontal cortex of macaque monkeys trained to flexibly report perceptual judgments of ambiguous visual stimuli. We find that the population activity initially represents the formation of a perceptual choice before transitioning into the representation of the motor plan. Stimulus strength and prior expectations both bear on the formation of the perceptual choice, but not on the formation of the action plan. These results suggest that prefrontal circuits involved in action selection are also used for the deliberation of abstract propositions divorced from a specific motor plan, thus providing a crucial mechanism for abstract reasoning.
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This content will become publicly available on April 1, 2026
Bayesian inference by visuomotor neurons in the prefrontal cortex
Perceptual judgments of the environment emerge from the concerted activity of neural populations in decision-making areas downstream of the sensory cortex. When the sensory input is ambiguous, perceptual judgments can be biased by prior expectations shaped by environmental regularities. These effects are examples of Bayesian inference, a reasoning method in which prior knowledge is leveraged to optimize uncertain decisions. However, it is not known how decision-making circuits combine sensory signals and prior expectations to form a perceptual decision. Here, we study neural population activity in the prefrontal cortex of macaque monkeys trained to report perceptual judgments of ambiguous visual stimuli under two different stimulus distributions. We isolate the component of the neural population response that represents the formation of the perceptual decision (the decision variable, DV), and find that its dynamical evolution reflects the integration of sensory signals and prior expectations. Prior expectations impact the DV’s trajectory both before and during stimulus presentation such that DV trajectories with a smaller dynamic range result in more biased and less sensitive perceptual decisions. We show that these results resemble a specific variant of Bayesian inference known as approximate hierarchical inference. Our findings expand our understanding of the mechanisms by which prefrontal circuits can execute Bayesian inference.
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- Award ID(s):
- 2146369
- PAR ID:
- 10613904
- Publisher / Repository:
- National Academy of Sciences
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Volume:
- 122
- Issue:
- 13
- ISSN:
- 0027-8424
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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