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Title: The Resilience Inference Measurement (RIM) Approach to Measuring and Predicting Community Resilience to Coastal Hazards
Award ID(s):
2318203 2316367
PAR ID:
10621468
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ;
Publisher / Repository:
Coastal Education and Research Foundation
Date Published:
Journal Name:
Journal of Coastal Research
Volume:
113
Issue:
sp1
ISSN:
0749-0208
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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