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Large-scale online recommendation systems must facilitate the allocation of a limited number of items among competing users while learning their preferences from user feedback. As a principled way of incorporating market constraints and user incentives in the design, we consider our objectives to be two-fold: maximal social welfare with minimal instability. To maximize social welfare, our proposed framework enhances the quality of recommendations by exploring allocations that optimistically maximize the rewards. To minimize instability, a measure of users' incentives to deviate from recommended allocations, the algorithm prices the items based on a scheme derived from the Walrasian equilibria. Though it is known that these equilibria yield stable prices for markets with known user preferences, our approach accounts for the inherent uncertainty in the preferences and further ensures that the users accept their recommendations under offered prices. To the best of our knowledge, our approach is the first to integrate techniques from combinatorial bandits, optimal resource allocation, and collaborative filtering to obtain an algorithm that achieves sub-linear social welfare regret as well as sub-linear instability. Empirical studies on synthetic and real-world data also demonstrate the efficacy of our strategy compared to approaches that do not fully incorporate all these aspects.
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This content will become publicly available on December 10, 2025
Fair and Welfare Efficient Constrained Multi-Matchings Under Uncertainty
We study fair allocation of constrained resources, where a market designer optimizes overall welfare while maintaining group fairness. In many large-scale settings, utilities are not known in advance, but are instead observed after realizing the allocation. We therefore estimate agent utilities using machine learning. Optimizing over estimates requires trading-off between mean utilities and their predictive variances. We discuss these trade-offs under two paradigms for preference modeling – in the stochastic optimization regime, the market designer has access to a probability distribution over utilities, and in the robust optimization regime they have access to an uncertainty set containing the true utilities with high probability. We discuss utilitarian and egalitarian welfare objectives, and we explore how to optimize for them under stochastic and robust paradigms. We demonstrate the efficacy of our approaches on three publicly available conference reviewer assignment datasets. The approaches presented enable scalable constrained resource allocation under uncertainty for many combinations of objectives and preference models.
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- Award ID(s):
- 2327057
- PAR ID:
- 10628529
- Editor(s):
- Globerson, A; Mackey, L; Belgrave, D; Fan, A; Paquet, U; Tomczak, J; Zhang, C
- Publisher / Repository:
- Curran Associates, Inc.
- Date Published:
- Volume:
- 37
- ISBN:
- 9798331314385
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Location:
- Vancouver, Canada
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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