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Title: Self-adaptive PSRO: Towards an Automatic Population-based Game Solver
Policy-Space Response Oracles (PSRO) as a general algorithmic framework has achieved state-of-the-art performance in learning equilibrium policies of two-player zero-sum games. However, the hand-crafted hyperparameter value selection in most of the existing works requires extensive domain knowledge, forming the main barrier to applying PSRO to different games. In this work, we make the first attempt to investigate the possibility of self-adaptively determining the optimal hyperparameter values in the PSRO framework. Our contributions are three-fold: (1) Using several hyperparameters, we propose a parametric PSRO that unifies the gradient descent ascent (GDA) and different PSRO variants. (2) We propose the self-adaptive PSRO (SPSRO) by casting the hyperparameter value selection of the parametric PSRO as a hyperparameter optimization (HPO) problem where our objective is to learn an HPO policy that can self-adaptively determine the optimal hyperparameter values during the running of the parametric PSRO. (3) To overcome the poor performance of online HPO methods, we propose a novel offline HPO approach to optimize the HPO policy based on the Transformer architecture. Experiments on various two-player zero-sum games demonstrate the superiority of SPSRO over different baselines.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
2414554 2302999
PAR ID:
10632701
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ; ; ; ;
Publisher / Repository:
International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization
Date Published:
ISBN:
978-1-956792-04-1
Page Range / eLocation ID:
139 to 147
Format(s):
Medium: X
Location:
Jeju, South Korea
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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