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We use estimates of time preferences to customize incentives for polio vaccinators in Lahore, Pakistan. We measure time preferences using intertemporal allocations of effort, and use these estimates to construct individually tailored incentives. We evaluate the effect of matching contract terms to discounting parameters in a subsequent experiment with the same vaccinators. Our tailored policy is compared with alternatives that either rely on atheoretic reduced-form relationships for policy guidance or apply the same policy to all individuals. We find that contracts tailored to individual discounting outperform this range of policy alternatives. 

In value-based decision making, options are selected according to subjective values assigned by the individual to available goods and actions. Despite the importance of this faculty of the mind, the neural mechanisms of value assignments, and how choices are directed by them, remain obscure. To investigate this problem, we used a classic measure of utility maximization, the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference, to quantify internal consistency of food preferences in Caenorhabditis elegans, a nematode worm with a nervous system of only 302 neurons. Using a novel combination of microfluidics and electrophysiology, we found that C. elegans food choices fulfill the necessary and sufficient conditions for utility maximization, indicating that nematodes behave as if they maintain, and attempt to maximize, an underlying representation of subjective value. Food choices are well-fit by a utility function widely used to model human consumers. Moreover, as in many other animals, subjective values in C. elegans are learned, a process we find requires intact dopamine signaling. Differential responses of identified chemosensory neurons to foods with distinct growth potentials are amplified by prior consumption of these foods, suggesting that these neurons may be part of a value-assignment system. The demonstration of utility maximization in an organism with a very small nervous system sets a new lower bound on the computational requirements for utility maximization and offers the prospect of an essentially complete explanation of value-based decision making at single neuron resolution in this organism. 

Does higher socioeconomic status predict decreased prosocial behavior? Methodological issues such as the reliance of survey studies on self-reported measures of prosociality, the insufficient control of relative incentives in experiments, and the use of non-random samples, have prevented researchers from ruling out that there is a negative association between socioeconomic status (SES) and prosociality. Here, we present results from a field experiment on the willingness of unaware individuals of different SES to undertake an effortful prosocial task—returning a misdelivered letter. Specifically, using the rental or sale value of homes as indicators of SES, we randomly selected households of high and low SES and misdelivered envelopes to them. Despite controlling for numerous covariates and performing a series of ancillary tests, we fail to find any evidence that higher SES predicts decreased prosocial behavior. Instead, we find that misdelivered letters are substantially more likely to be returned from high rather than low SES households. 

What is the value of pledges if they are often reneged upon? In this paper, we show—both theoretically and experimentally—that pledges can be used to screen donors and to better understand their motives for giving. In return, nonprofit managers can use the information they glean from pledges to better target future charitable giving appeals and interventions to donors, such as expressions of gratitude. In an experiment, we find that offering the option to pledge gifts induces self-selection. If expressions of gratitude are then targeted to individuals who select into pledges, reneging can be significantly reduced. Our findings provide an explanation for the potential usefulness of pledges. 

We usually assume purchasers of commodities experience utility at the point of transacting a purchase, when money and ownership are exchanged. With charitable giving, the social rewards from giving can begin being enjoyed the moment a decision to give has been made. Later, when the gift is transacted, the donor can again experience utility from giving and seeing their donations at work. We show both theoretically and experimentally that these early flows of social utility can generate time inconsistent charitable giving. A fundraiser can get more donations (50 percent more in our Experiment 1) by allowing a donor to decide now to give later. We develop a theoretical model of social utility gained through social image concerns, and in two additional experiments examine its implications for commitment demand and test the model predictions for how charities can manipulate information to influence time inconsistent charitable giving. 

The ability to predict when societies will replace one social norm for another can have significant implications for welfare, especially when norms are detrimental. A popular theory poses that the pressure to conform to social norms creates tipping thresholds which, once passed, propel societies toward an alternative state. Predicting when societies will reach a tipping threshold, however, has been a major challenge because of the lack of experimental data for evaluating competing models. We present evidence from a large-scale laboratory experiment designed to test the theoretical predictions of a threshold model for social tipping and norm change. In our setting, societal preferences change gradually, forcing individuals to weigh the benefit from deviating from the norm against the cost from not conforming to the behavior of others. We show that the model correctly predicts in 96% of instances when a society will succeed or fail to abandon a detrimental norm. Strikingly, we observe widespread persistence of detrimental norms even when individuals determine the cost for nonconformity themselves as they set the latter too high. Interventions that facilitate a common understanding of the benefits from change help most societies abandon detrimental norms. We also show that instigators of change tend to be more risk tolerant and to dislike conformity more. Our findings demonstrate the value of threshold models for understanding social tipping in a broad range of social settings and for designing policies to promote welfare. 

In this article, Andreoni and Durnford explain the details and potential economic implications of IRS data for 2018 showing steep declines in itemization status and charitable deductions as a result of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.