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Motivated by practical concerns in applying information design to markets and service systems, we consider a persuasion problem between a sender and a receiver where the receiver may not be an expected utility maximizer. In particular, the receiver’s utility may be non-linear in her belief; we deem such receivers as risk-conscious. Such utility models arise, for example, when the receiver exhibits sensitivity to the variability and the risk in the payoff on choosing an action (e.g., waiting time for a service). In the presence of such non-linearity, the standard approach of using revelation-principle style arguments fails to characterize the setmore »Free, publicly-accessible full text available December 10, 2020