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  1. Lipman, Barton (Ed.)
    We study the design of optimal mechanisms when the designer is uncertain both about the form of information held by the agents and also about which equilibrium will be played. Theguaranteeof a mechanism is its worst performance across all information structures and equilibria. Thepotentialof an information structure is its best performance across all mechanisms and equilibria. We formulate a pair of linear programs, one of which is a lower bound on the maximum guarantee across all mechanisms, and the other of which is an upper bound on the minimum potential across all information structures. In applications to public expenditure, bilateral trade, and optimal auctions, we use the bounding programs to characterize guarantee‐maximizing mechanisms and potential‐minimizing information structures and show that the max guarantee is equal to the min potential. 
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  2. Abstract Determining why earthquake ruptures stop is a central challenge in earthquake science and seismic hazard assessment. The Pütürge segment of the East Anatolian Fault Zone, Türkiye, exhibits shallow creep (<∼3 km depth) yet hosts M > 6.5 earthquake ruptures at greater depth. Here, we evaluate whether variations in frictional stability along this segment aided arrest of the 2020 M 6.7 Elaziğ and 2023 M 7.8 Pazarcık earthquake ruptures. Analysis of Sentinel-1 Synthetic Aperture Radar imagery indicates the 2023 M 7.8 rupture propagated laterally into a metamorphic massif within the Pütürge segment, where slip rapidly decayed below detection limits. Creepmeters along this segment recorded no significant surface afterslip (<3 mm) in the following year. To investigate this fault-slip behavior, we conducted triaxial friction experiments on Pütürge fault gouge sampled from an outcrop exposure. The gouge, composed primarily of muscovite, quartz, and calcite, is velocity strengthening at conditions approximating 0–2.5 km depth and velocity weakening at 4–5 km depth. This transition to velocity-weakening friction is associated with enhanced comminution and shear localization observed microstructurally. Our results suggest that depth-dependent frictional stability of the Pütürge fault segment facilitates rupture nucleation and propagation at depth while maintaining rupture-arresting behavior near Earth’s surface. 
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    Free, publicly-accessible full text available March 3, 2027
  3. Key Points We observed seafloor offset at a GNSS‐Acoustic site along the Alaska subduction zone following the 22 July 2020 Mw7.8 Simeonof earthquake Additional slip updip of the main earthquake rupture area is not required to generate the observed seafloor offset The shallow plate interface was partially locked prior to the Simeonof earthquake and may still host unrelieved strain 
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  4. We describe a methodology for making counterfactual predictions in settings where the information held by strategic agents and the distribution of payoff-relevant states of the world are unknown. The analyst observes behavior assumed to be rationalized by a Bayesian model, in which agents maximize expected utility, given partial and differential information about the state. A counterfactual prediction is desired about behavior in another strategic setting, under the hypothesis that the distribution of the state and agents’ information about the state are held fixed. When the data and the desired counterfactual prediction pertain to environments with finitely many states, players, and actions, the counterfactual prediction is described by finitely many linear inequalities, even though the latent parameter, the information structure, is infinite dimensional. (JEL D44, D82, D83) 
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  5. Abstract Quantifying off-fault deformation in the near field remains a challenge for earthquake monitoring using geodetic observations. We propose an automated change detection strategy using geometric primitives generated using a deep neural network, random sample consensus and least squares adjustment. Using mobile laser scanning point clouds of vineyards acquired after the magnitude 6.0 2014 South Napa earthquake, our results reveal centimeter-level horizontal ground deformation over three kilometers along a segment of the West Napa Fault. A fault trace is detected from rows of vineyards modeled as planar primitives from the accumulated coseismic response, and the postseismic surface displacement field is revealed by tracking displacements of vineyard posts modeled as cylindrical primitives. Interpreted from the detected changes, we summarized distributions of deformation versus off-fault distances and found evidence of off-fault deformation. The proposed framework using geometric primitives is shown to be accurate and practical for detection of near-field off-fault deformation. 
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  6. Seafloor geodesy reveals rapid up-dip afterslip following the M w 8.2 Chignik subduction zone earthquake. 
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  7. null (Ed.)
    A profit‐maximizing seller has a single unit of a good to sell. The bidders have a pure common value that is drawn from a distribution that is commonly known. The seller does not know the bidders' beliefs about the value and thinks that beliefs are designed adversarially by Nature to minimize profit. We construct a strong maxmin solution to this joint mechanism design and information design problem, consisting of a mechanism, an information structure, and an equilibrium, such that neither the seller nor Nature can move profit in their respective preferred directions, even if the deviator can select the new equilibrium. The mechanism and information structure solve a family of maxmin mechanism design and minmax information design problems, regardless of how an equilibrium is selected. The maxmin mechanism takes the form of a proportional auction : each bidder submits a one‐dimensional bid, the aggregate allocation and aggregate payment depend on the aggregate bid, and individual allocations and payments are proportional to bids. We report a number of additional properties of the maxmin mechanisms, including what happens as the number of bidders grows large and robustness with respect to the prior over the value. 
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