skip to main content
US FlagAn official website of the United States government
dot gov icon
Official websites use .gov
A .gov website belongs to an official government organization in the United States.
https lock icon
Secure .gov websites use HTTPS
A lock ( lock ) or https:// means you've safely connected to the .gov website. Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites.

Explore Research Products in the PAR
It may take a few hours for recently added research products to appear in PAR search results.


  • Home
  • Search Results
  • Page 1 of 1

Search for: All records

Creators/Authors contains: "Cabral, Marika"

Note: When clicking on a Digital Object Identifier (DOI) number, you will be taken to an external site maintained by the publisher. Some full text articles may not yet be available without a charge during the embargo (administrative interval).
What is a DOI Number?

Some links on this page may take you to non-federal websites. Their policies may differ from this site.

  1. ; ; (, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy)
    Provider payments are the key determinant of insurance generosity within many health insurance programs covering low-income populations. This paper analyzes a large, federally mandated provider payment increase for primary care services provided to low-income elderly and disabled individuals. Using comprehensive administrative data, we leverage variation across beneficiaries and providers in the policy-induced payment increase in difference-in-differences and triple differences research designs. We find the payment increase led to a 6 percent increase in the targeted services for eligible beneficiaries, implying a payment elasticity of 1.2, and decreased the fraction of low-income beneficiaries with no primary care visit in a year by 9 percent. (JEL G22, I11, I13, I18, I38) 
    more » « less
    Free, publicly-accessible full text available February 1, 2026
  2. ; (, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics)
    Leveraging unique administrative data and a sharp increase in benefit generosity in a difference-in-differences research design, we estimate the impact of workers’ compensation wage replacement benefits on individual behavior and program costs. We find that increased benefit generosity leads to longer income benefit durations and increased medical spending. Responses along these two margins are equally important drivers of increased program costs, collectively increasing program costs 1.4 times the mechanical increase in costs. Using these estimates and an estimate of the consumption drop among injured workers, our welfare calibrations suggest that a marginal increase in benefit generosity would not improve welfare. (JEL D91, I11, J28, J31) 
    more » « less
    Free, publicly-accessible full text available July 1, 2025
  3. ; (, American Economic Review)
    Little is known about what drives gender disparities in health care and related social insurance benefits. Using data and variation from the Texas workers’ compensation program, we study the impact of gender match between doctors and patients on medical evaluations and associated disability benefits. Compared to differences among their male patient counterparts, female patients randomly assigned a female doctor rather than a male doctor are 5.2 percent more likely to be evaluated as disabled and receive 8.6 percent more subsequent cash benefits on average. There is no analogous gender-match effect for male patients. Our estimates indicate that increasing the share of female patients evaluated by female doctors may substantially shrink gender gaps in medical evaluations and associated outcomes. (JEL H75, I11, I12, J14, J16, J28) 
    more » « less
    Full Text Available 
  4. ; ; (, American Economic Review)
    Workers’ compensation insurance, which provides no-fault coverage for work-related injuries, is mandatory in nearly all states. We use administrative data from a unique market without a coverage mandate to estimate the demand for workers’ compensation insurance, leveraging regulatory premium updates for identification. We find that a 1 percent increase in premiums leads to approximately a 0.3 percent decline in coverage. Drawing upon these estimates and data on costs, we examine potential justifications for government intervention to increase coverage. This analysis suggests that several forms of market failure—such as adverse selection, market power, and externalities—may not justify a mandate in this setting. (JEL G22, G52, J28, K13, K31) 
    more » « less
    Full Text Available