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  1. We model and analyze the Signal end-to-end messaging protocol within the UC framework. In particular: - We formulate an ideal functionality that captures end-to-end secure messaging, in a setting with PKI and an untrusted server, against an adversary that has full control over the network and can adaptively and momentarily compromise parties at any time and obtain their entire internal states. In particular our analysis captures the forward secrecy and recovery-of-security properties of Signal and the conditions under which they break. - We model the main components of the Signal architecture (PKI and long-term keys, the backbone continuous-key-exchange or "asymmetric ratchet," epoch-level symmetric ratchets, authenticated encryption) as individual ideal functionalities that are realized and analyzed separately and then composed using the UC and Global-State UC theorems. - We show how the ideal functionalities representing these components can be realized using standard cryptographic primitives under minimal hardness assumptions. Our modeling introduces additional innovations that enable arguing about the security of Signal irrespective of the underlying communication medium, as well as secure composition of dynamically generated modules that share state. These features, together with the basic modularity of the UC framework, will hopefully facilitate the use of both Signal-as-a-whole and its individualmore »components within cryptographic applications. Two other features of our modeling are the treatment of fully adaptive corruptions, and making minimal use of random oracle abstractions. In particular, we show how to realize continuous key exchange in the plain model, while preserving security against adaptive corruptions.« less
    Free, publicly-accessible full text available August 1, 2023
  2. Incoercible multi-party computation (Canetti-Gennaro ’96) allows parties to engage in secure computation with the additional guarantee that the public transcript of the computation cannot be used by a coercive outsider to verify representations made by the parties regarding their inputs, outputs, and local random choices. That is, it is guaranteed that the only deductions regarding the truthfulness of such representations, made by an outsider who has witnessed the communication among the parties, are the ones that can be drawn just from the represented inputs and outputs alone. To date, all incoercible secure computation protocols withstand coercion of only a fraction of the parties, or else assume that all parties use an execution environment that makes some crucial parts of their local states physically inaccessible even to themselves. We consider, for the first time, the setting where all parties are coerced, and the coercer expects to see the entire history of the computation. We allow both protocol participants and external attackers to access a common reference string which is generated once and for all by an uncorruptable trusted party. In this setting we construct: - A general multi-party function evaluation protocol, for any number of parties, that withstands coercion of allmore »parties, as long as all parties use the prescribed ``faking algorithm'' upon coercion. This holds even if the inputs and outputs represented by coerced parties are globally inconsistent with the evaluated function. - A general two-party function evaluation protocol that withstands even the %``mixed'' case where some of the coerced parties do follow the prescribed faking algorithm. (For instance, these parties might collude with the coercer and disclose their true local states.) This protocol is limited to functions where the input of at least one of the parties is taken from a small (poly-size) domain. It uses fully deniable encryption with public deniability for one of the parties; when instantiated using the fully deniable encryption of Canetti, Park, and Poburinnaya (Crypto'20), it takes 3 rounds of communication. Both protocols operate in the common reference string model, and use fully bideniable encryption (Canetti Park and Poburinnaya, Crypto'20) and sub-exponential indistinguishability obfuscation. Finally, we show that protocols with certain communication pattern cannot be incoercible, even in a weaker setting where only some parties are coerced.« less
  3. The Global and Externalized UC frameworks [Canetti-Dodis-Pass-Walfish, TCC 07] extend the plain UC framework to additionally handle protocols that use a "global setup", namely a mechanism that is also used by entities outside the protocol. These frameworks have broad applicability: Examples include public-key infrastructures, common reference strings, shared synchronization mechanisms, global blockchains, or even abstractions such as the random oracle. However, the need to work in a specialized framework has been a source of confusion, incompatibility, and an impediment to broader use. We show how security in the presence of a global setup can be captured within the plain UC framework, thus significantly simplifying the treatment. This is done as follows: - We extend UC-emulation to the case where both the emulating protocol π and the emulated protocol ϕ make subroutine calls to protocol γ that is accessible also outside π and ϕ. As usual, this notion considers only a single instance of ϕ or π (alongside γ). - We extend the UC theorem to hold even with respect to the new notion of UC emulation. That is, we show that if π UC-emulates ϕ in the presence of γ, then ρϕ→π UC-emulates ρ for any protocol ρ, even whenmore »ρ uses γ directly, and in addition calls many instances of ϕ, all of which use the same instance of γ. We prove this extension using the existing UC theorem as a black box, thus further simplifying the treatment. We also exemplify how our treatment can be used to streamline, within the plain UC model, proofs of security of systems that involve global set-up, thus providing greater simplicity and flexibility.« less
  4. This work presents a general framework for describing cryptographic protocols and analyzing their security. The framework allows specifying the security requirements of practically any cryptographic task in a unified and systematic way. Furthermore, in this framework the security of protocols is preserved under a general composition operation, called universal composition. The proposed framework with its security-preserving composition operation allows for modular design and analysis of complex cryptographic protocols from simpler building blocks. Moreover, within this framework, protocols are guaranteed to maintain their security in any context, even in the presence of an unbounded number of arbitrary protocol sessions that run concurrently in an adversarially controlled manner. This is a useful guarantee, which allows arguing about the security of cryptographic protocols in complex and unpredictable environments such as modern communication networks.
  5. Successful containment of the Coronavirus pandemic rests on the ability to quickly and reliably identify those who have been in close proximity to a contagious individual. Existing tools for doing so rely on the collection of exact location information of individuals over lengthy time periods, and combining this information with other personal information. This unprecedented encroachment on individual privacy at national scales has created an outcry and risks rejection of these tools. We propose an alternative: an extremely simple scheme for providing fine-grained and timely alerts to users who have been in the close vicinity of an infected individual. Crucially, this is done while preserving the anonymity of all individuals, and without collecting or storing any personal information or location history. Our approach is based on using short-range communication mechanisms, like Bluetooth, that are available in all modern cell phones. It can be deployed with very little infrastructure, and incurs a relatively low false-positive rate compared to other collocation methods. We also describe a number of extensions and tradeoffs. We believe that the privacy guarantees provided by the scheme will encourage quick and broad voluntary adoption. When combined with sufficient testing capacity and existing best practices from healthcare professionals, wemore »hope that this may significantly reduce the infection rate.« less
  6. We present a methodology for using the EasyCrypt proof assistant (originally designed for mechanizing the generation of proofs of game-based security of cryptographic schemes and protocols) to mechanize proofs of security of cryptographic protocols within the universally composable (UC) security framework. This allows, for the first time, the mechanization and formal verification of the entire sequence of steps needed for proving simulation-based security in a modular way: * Specifying a protocol and the desired ideal functionality. * Constructing a simulator and demonstrating its validity, via reduction to hard computational problems. * Invoking the universal composition operation and demonstrating that it indeed preserves security. We demonstrate our methodology on a simple example: stating and proving the security of secure message communication via a one-time pad, where the key comes from a Diffie-Hellman key-exchange, assuming ideally authenticated communication. We first put together EasyCrypt-verified proofs that: (a) the Diffie-Hellman protocol UC-realizes an ideal key-exchange functionality, assuming hardness of the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem, and (b) one-time-pad encryption, with a key obtained using ideal key-exchange, UC-realizes an ideal secure-communication functionality. We then mechanically combine the two proofs into an EasyCrypt-verified proof that the composed protocol realizes the same ideal secure-communication functionality. Although formulating a methodologymore »that is both sound and workable has proven to be a complex task, we are hopeful that it will prove to be the basis for mechanized UC security analyses for significantly more complex protocols.« less