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Mutually Agreed Norms on Routing Security (MANRS) is an industry-led initiative to improve Internet routing security by encouraging participating networks to implement a series of mandatory or recommended actions. MANRS members must register their IP prefixes in a trusted routing database and use such information to prevent propagation of invalid routing information. MANRS membership has increased significantly in recent years, but the impact of the MANRS initiative on the overall Internet routing security remains unclear. In this paper, we provide the first independent look into the MANRS ecosystem by using publicly available data to analyze the routing behavior of participant networks. We quantify MANRS participants' level of conformance with the stated requirements, and compare the behavior of MANRS and non-MANRS networks. While not all MANRS members fully comply with all required actions, we find that they are more likely to implement routing security practices described in MANRS actions. We assess the relevance of the MANRS effort in securing the overall routing ecosystem. We found that as of May 2022, over 83% of MANRS networks were conformant to the route filtering requirement by dropping BGP messages with invalid information according to authoritative records, and over 95% were conformant to the routing information facilitation requirement, registering their resources in authoritative databases. 

The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the protocol that networks use to exchange (announce) routing information across the Internet. Unfortunately, BGP has no mechanism to prevent unauthorized announcement of network addresses, also known as prefix hijacks. Since the 1990s, the primary means of protecting against unauthorized origin announcements has been the use of routing information databases, so that networks can verify prefix origin information they receive from their neighbors in BGP messages. In the 1990s, operators deployed databases now collectively known as the Internet Routing Registry (IRR), which depend on voluntary (although sometimes contractually required) contribution of routing information without strict (or sometimes any) validation. Coverage, accuracy, and use of these databases remains inconsistent across ISPs and over time. In 2012, after years of debate over approaches to improving routing security, the operator community deployed an alternative known as the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). The RPKI includes cryptographic attestation of records, including expiration dates, with each Regional Internet Registry (RIR) operating as a "root" of trust. Similar to the IRR, operators can use the RPKI to discard routing messages that do not pass origin validation checks. But the additional integrity comes with complexity and cost. Furthermore, operational and legal implications of potential malfunctions have limited registration in and use of the RPKI. In response, some networks have redoubled their efforts to improve the accuracy of IRR registration data. These two technologies are now operating in parallel, along with the option of doing nothing at all to validate routes. Although RPKI use is growing, its limited coverage means that security-conscious operators may query both IRR and RPKI databases to maximize routing security. However, IRR information may be inaccurate due to improper hygiene, such as not updating the origin information after changes in routing policy or prefix ownership. Since RPKI uses a stricter registration and validation process, we use it as a baseline against which to compare the trends in accuracy and coverage of IRR data. 

The Internet Route Registry (IRR) and Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) both emerged as different solutions to improve routing security in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) by allowing networks to register information and develop route filters based on information other networks have registered. RPKI is a crypto system, with associated complexity and policy challenges; it has seen substantial but slowing adoption. IRR databases often contain inaccurate records due to lack of validation standards. Given the widespread use of IRR for routing security purposes, this inaccuracy merits further study. We study IRR accuracy by quantifying the consistency between IRR and RPKI records, analyze the causes of inconsistency, and examine which ASes are contributing correct IRR information. In October 2021, we found ROAs for around 20% of RADB IRR records, and a consistency of 38% and 60% in v4 and v6. For RIPE IRR, we found ROAs for 47% records and a consistency of 73% and 82% in v4 and v6. For APNIC IRR, we found ROAs for 76% records and a high consistency of 98% and 99% in v4 and v6. For AFRINIC IRR, we found ROAs for only 4% records and a consistency of 93% and 97% in v4 and v6.