Search for: All records

Moral foundations theory proposes that there are two types of moral domains: the individualizing domain, which relates to individual welfare (comprising harm and fairness foundations), and the binding domain, which relates to communal and spiritual welfare (comprising loyalty, authority, and purity foundations). In this investigation, we demonstrate that this distinction is not universal. Specifically, across five studies (totalN= 1,211) conducted among Jews in Israel and Christians in the United States, we show that the core religious belief that people are created in the image of God is associated not only with purity/divinity values that are typically considered to be part of the binding domain but also with the individualizing moral domain. In two correlational studies, we find that this belief is highly correlated with religiosity but that it predicts greater endorsement of the individualizing moral domain (Studies 1–2). Two experimental studies further establish that this belief is associated with endorsing the individualizing moral domain and the moral foundation of purity, but not the communal foundations (Studies 3–4). Finally, in Study 5, we demonstrate that these experimental findings are not driven by belief in God. We conclude that the distinction between individualizing and binding moral domains is more culturally contingent than previously believed. We discuss the broader implications of the belief in creation in the image of God for understanding moral judgments pertaining to human dignity. 

Abstract War is often characterised by indiscriminate violence against civilians. It is critical to understand why ordinary people might support acts such as ethnic cleansing or genocide, as popular support facilitates campaigns of indiscriminate violence. Theory suggests that support may rest on ideologies and narratives that portray the target group as less than human and threatening, thereby creating a moral mandate for killing. However, there has been little empirical study of these mechanisms during outbreaks of extreme violence. Here we report studies carried out in an ongoing campaign of violence in Gaza and Israel (n = 2462), showing that alongside such narratives, popular support for violence against civilians derives from a common cognitive error we term the hate-motive bias: the tendency to overestimate hate motives, and underestimate defensive motives, of outgroup aggression. Hate-motive bias predicted support for various forms of violence against civilians even while statistically accounting for other predictors such as ideological orientation, dehumanisation of outgroups and perceived threat. Our results suggest that a common attribution bias may contribute to ordinary citizens supporting behaviour they might typically deplore. Efforts to correct this bias may offer a behavioural science lever for reducing popular support for violence against civilians. 

ABSTRACT To what extent are preferences for individual versus collective rights shaped by historical experiences, particularly colonialism? To answer this question, we conducted field studies in Fiji, a former British colony, home to two populations with distinct histories of colonial subjugation. We reasoned that for Indigenous iTaukei, for whom collective rights were stripped, prioritizing group rights on issues tied to colonial harm would be seen as essential for cultural survival. Contrastingly, we reasoned that Indo‐Fijians (descendants of indentured laborers brought to Fiji under colonial rule) would prefer equal rights for all. In Study 1, we assessed attitudes toward equality across various social and political issues, finding that iTaukei were less likely to endorse equality, particularly concerning land ownership. Study 2 explored iTaukei perceptions of land rights, revealing that they view granting Indo‐Fijians land access as a threat to their identity and survival. Study 3 explored support for democratic norms, themselves an artifact of Western legal thinking imposed upon Fiji. While support for democratic norms was high in abstract, members of both groups were more supportive of democratic violations when such violations served their group's interests. Findings highlight the lasting psychological impact of colonialism, demonstrating how historical grievances shape reasoning about rights and governance in postcolonial societies. Understanding these dynamics provides insight into contemporary intergroup conflict and the tension between universal democratic principles and Indigenous collective rights. This work contributes to broader discussions on decolonization and underscores the need for culturally sensitive approaches to human rights discourse. 

Recent research documents that thinking about God encourages intergroup prosociality among believers. An open question is whether such increased prosociality is dampened by intergroup conflict. We conducted preregistered field experiments with two ethno-religious populations in Fiji: indigenous Christian iTaukei ( N = 324) and Hindu Indo-Fijians ( N = 280). In each study, we manipulated (between-person) whether participants thought about intergroup conflict before completing a dictator game in which we manipulated (within-person) whether participants thought about God’s preferences when allocating real money to an outgroup member. Although participants who reflected on intergroup conflict gave less money away to outgroup members, thinking about God led to significant and comparable increases in intergroup prosociality regardless of whether participants thought about conflict. Results challenge widely-held assumptions about the role of religious belief in intergroup conflict and raise questions about mechanisms that are often theorized to explain the spread of religious beliefs themselves. 

Do employers have a responsibility to treat their workers equally or do employees have a right to be treated equally? In common discourse, rights and responsibilities are often used as substitutable framings for the same event, but they may differentially shape judgment. In this investigation, we develop an experimental manipulation of rights versus responsibilities and evaluate whether framing an arrangement between two parties in terms of rights, versus responsibilities, affects people’s judgment. We found that people judged unequal distributions between two parties as less fair when framed in terms of rights than in terms of responsibilities. Furthermore, people judged a rights framing as fairer for an unequal (vs. equal) contractual agreement. Thus, a subtle framing manipulation can increase or decrease people’s sensitivity to unequal distributions. We discuss potential mechanisms for this effect and implications for behavioral law as well as the potential to nudge people’s sensitivity to inequality.