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  1. We propose a new architecture to approximately learn incentive compatible, revenue-maximizing auctions from sampled valuations. Our architecture uses the Sinkhorn algorithm to perform a differentiable bipartite matching which allows the network to learn strategyproof revenue-maximizing mechanisms in settings not learnable by the previous RegretNet architecture. In particular, our architecture is able to learn mechanisms in settings without free disposal where each bidder must be allocated exactly some number of items. In experiments, we show our approach successfully recovers multiple known optimal mechanisms and high-revenue, low-regret mechanisms in larger settings where the optimal mechanism is unknown. 
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  2. Facial analysis systems have been deployed by large companies and critiqued by scholars and activists for the past decade. Many existing algorithmic audits examine the performance of these systems on later stage elements of facial analysis systems like facial recognition and age, emotion, or perceived gender prediction; however, a core component to these systems has been vastly understudied from a fairness perspective: face detection, sometimes called face localization. Since face detection is a pre-requisite step in facial analysis systems, the bias we observe in face detection will flow downstream to the other components like facial recognition and emotion prediction. Additionally, no prior work has focused on the robustness of these systems under various perturbations and corruptions, which leaves open the question of how various people are impacted by these phenomena. We present the first of its kind detailed benchmark of face detection systems, specifically examining the robustness to noise of commercial and academic models. We use both standard and recently released academic facial datasets to quantitatively analyze trends in face detection robustness. Across all the datasets and systems, we generally find that photos of individuals who are masculine presenting, older, of darker skin type, or have dim lighting are more susceptible to errors than their counterparts in other identities. 
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  3. Low-resolution analog-to-digital converters (ADCs) simplify the design of millimeter-wave (mmWave) massive multi-user multiple-input multiple-output (MU-MIMO) basestations, but increase vulnerability to jamming attacks. As a remedy, we propose HERMIT (short for Hybrid jammER MITigation), a method that combines a hardware-friendly adaptive analog transform with a corresponding digital equalizer: The analog transform removes most of the jammer’s energy prior to data conversion; the digital equalizer suppresses jammer residues while detecting the legitimate transmit data. We provide theoretical results that establish the optimal analog transform as a function of the user equipments’ and the jammer’s channels. Using simulations with mmWave channel models, we demonstrate the superiority of HERMIT compared both to purely digital jammer mitigation as well as to a recent hybrid method that mitigates jammer interference with a nonadaptive analog transform. 
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  4. Data poisoning and backdoor attacks manipulate training data in order to cause models to fail during inference. A recent survey of industry practitioners found that data poisoning is the number one concern among threats ranging from model stealing to adversarial attacks. However, it remains unclear exactly how dangerous poisoning methods are and which ones are more effective considering that these methods, even ones with identical objectives, have not been tested in consistent or realistic settings. We observe that data poisoning and backdoor attacks are highly sensitive to variations in the testing setup. Moreover, we find that existing methods may not generalize to realistic settings. While these existing works serve as valuable prototypes for data poisoning, we apply rigorous tests to determine the extent to which we should fear them. In order to promote fair comparison in future work, we develop standardized benchmarks for data poisoning and backdoor attacks. 
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