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Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) leverage computations to operate physical objects in real-world environments, and increasingly more CPS-based applications have been designed for life-critical applications. Therefore, any vulnerability in such a system can lead to severe consequences if exploited by adversaries. In this paper, we present a data predictive recovery system to safeguard the CPS from sensor attacks, assuming that we can identify compromised sensors from data. Our recovery system guarantees that the CPS will never encounter unsafe states and will smoothly recover to a target set within a conservative deadline. It also guarantees that the CPS will remain within the target set for a specified period. Major highlights of our paper include (i) the recovery procedure works on nonlinear systems, (ii) the method leverages uncorrupted sensors to relieve uncertainty accumulation, and (iii) an extensive set of experiments on various nonlinear benchmarks that demonstrate our framework's performance and efficiency. 

Classification of clinical alarms is at the heart of prioritization, suppression, integration, postponement, and other methods of mitigating alarm fatigue. Since these methods directly affect clinical care, alarm classifiers, such as intelligent suppression systems, need to be evaluated in terms of their sensitivity and specificity, which is typically calculated on a labeled dataset of alarms. Unfortunately, the collection and particularly labeling of such datasets requires substantial effort and time, thus deterring hospitals from investigating mitigations of alarm fatigue. This article develops a lightweight method for evaluating alarm classifiers without perfect alarm labels. The method relies on probabilistic labels obtained from data programming—a labeling paradigm based on combining noisy and cheap-to-obtain labeling heuristics. Based on these labels, the method produces confidence bounds for the sensitivity/specificity values from a hypothetical evaluation with manual labeling. Our experiments on five alarm datasets collected at Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia show that the proposed method provides accurate bounds on the classifier’s sensitivity/specificity, appropriately reflecting the uncertainty from noisy labeling and limited sample sizes. 

The use of learning based components in cyber-physical systems (CPS) has created a gamut of possible avenues to use high dimensional real world signals generated from sensors like camera and LiDAR. The ability to process such signals can be largely attributed to the adoption of high-capacity function approximators like deep neural networks. However, this does not come without its potential perils. The pitfalls arise from possible over-fitting, and subsequent unsafe behavior when exposed to unknown environments. One challenge is that, in high dimensional input spaces it is almost impossible to experience enough training data in the design phase. What is required here, is an efficient way to flag out-of-distribution (OOD) samples that is precise enough to not raise too many false alarms. In addition, the system needs to be able to detect these in a computationally efficient manner at runtime. In this paper, our proposal is to build good representations for in-distribution data. We introduce the idea of a memory bank to store prototypical samples from the input space. We use these memories to compute probability density estimates using kernel density estimation techniques. We evaluate our technique on two challenging scenarios : a self-driving car setting implemented inside the simulator CARLA with image inputs, and an autonomous racing car navigation setting, with LiDAR inputs. In both settings, it was observed that a deviation from in-distribution setting can potentially lead to deviation from safe behavior. An added benefit of using training samples as memories to detect out-of-distribution inputs is that the system is interpretable to a human operator. Explanation of this nature is generally hard to obtain from pure deep learning based alternatives. Our code for reproducing the experiments is available at https:// github.com/ yangy96/ interpretable_ood_detection.git 

The increasing autonomy and connectivity in cyber-physical systems (CPS) come with new security vulnerabilities that are easily exploitable by malicious attackers to spoof a system to perform dangerous actions. While the vast majority of existing works focus on attack prevention and detection, the key question is “what to do after detecting an attack?”. This problem attracts fairly rare attention though its significance is emphasized by the need to mitigate or even eliminate attack impacts on a system. In this article, we study this attack response problem and propose novel real-time recovery for securing CPS. First, this work’s core component is a recovery control calculator using a Linear-Quadratic Regulator (LQR) with timing and safety constraints. This component can smoothly steer back a physical system under control to a target state set before a safe deadline and maintain the system state in the set once it is driven to it. We further propose an Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) based algorithm that can fast solve the LQR-based recovery problem. Second, supporting components for the attack recovery computation include a checkpointer, a state reconstructor, and a deadline estimator. To realize these components respectively, we propose (i) a sliding-window-based checkpointing protocol that governs sufficient trustworthy data, (ii) a state reconstruction approach that uses the checkpointed data to estimate the current system state, and (iii) a reachability-based approach to conservatively estimate a safe deadline. Finally, we implement our approach and demonstrate its effectiveness in dealing with totally 15 experimental scenarios which are designed based on 5 CPS simulators and 3 types of sensor attacks.