Search for: All records

Can deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs) for image classification be interpreted as utility maximizers with information costs? By performing set-valued system identifica- tion for Bayesian decision systems, we demonstrate that deep CNNs behave equivalently (in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions) to rationally inattentive Bayesian utility maximizers, a generative model used extensively in economics for human decision-making. Our claim is based on approximately 500 numerical experiments on 5 widely used neural network archi- tectures. The parameters of the resulting interpretable model are computed efficiently via convex feasibility algorithms. As a practical application, we also illustrate how the reconstructed interpretable model can predict the classification performance of deep CNNs with high accuracy. The theoretical foundation of our approach lies in Bayesian revealed preference studied in micro-economics. All our results are on GitHub and completely reproducible. 

A metacognitive radar switches between two modes of cognition— one mode to achieve a high-quality estimate of targets, and the other mode to hide its utility function (plan). To achieve high-quality es- timates of targets, a cognitive radar performs a constrained utility maximization to adapt its sensing mode in response to a changing target environment. If an adversary can estimate the utility function of a cognitive radar, it can determine the radar’s sensing strategy and mitigate the radar performance via electronic countermeasures (ECM). This article discusses a metacognitive radar that switches between two modes of cognition: achieving satisfactory estimates of a target while hiding its strategy from an adversary that detects cognition. The radar does so by transmitting purposefully designed suboptimal responses to spoof the adversary’s Neyman–Pearson de- tector. We provide theoretical guarantees by ensuring that the Type-I error probability of the adversary’s detector exceeds a predefined level for a specified tolerance on the radar’s performance loss. We illustrate our cognition-masking scheme via numerical examples in- volving waveform adaptation and beam allocation. We show that small purposeful deviations from the optimal emission confuse the adversary by significant amounts, thereby masking the radar’s cognition. Our approach uses ideas from revealed preference in microeconomics and adversarial inverse reinforcement learning. Our proposed algorithms provide a principled approach for system-level electronic counter- countermeasures to hide the radar’s strategy from an adversary. We also provide performance bounds for our cognition-masking scheme when the adversary has misspecified measurements of the radar’s response. 

Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) deals with estimating an agent’s utility function from its actions. In this paper, we consider how an agent can hide its strategy and mitigate an adversarial IRL attack; we call this inverse IRL (I-IRL). How should the decision maker choose its response to ensure a poor reconstruction of its strategy by an adversary performing IRL to estimate the agent’s strategy? This paper comprises four results: First, we present an adversarial IRL algorithm that estimates the agent’s strategy while controlling the agent’s utility function. Then, we propose an I-IRL result that mitigates the IRL algorithm used by the adversary. Our I-IRL results are based on revealed preference theory in microeconomics. The key idea is for the agent to deliberately choose sub-optimal responses so that its true strategy is sufficiently masked. Third, we give a sample complexity result for our main I-IRL result when the agent has noisy estimates of the adversary-specified utility function. Finally, we illustrate our I-IRL scheme in a radar problem where a meta-cognitive radar is trying to mitigate an adversarial target. 

We consider a novel application of inverse reinforcement learning with behavioral economics constraints to model, learn and predict the commenting behavior of YouTube viewers. Each group of users is modeled as a rationally inattentive Bayesian agent which solves a contextual bandit problem. Our methodology integrates three key components. First, to identify distinct commenting patterns, we use deep embedded clustering to estimate framing information (essential extrinsic features) that clusters users into distinct groups. Second, we present an inverse reinforcement learning algorithm that uses Bayesian revealed preferences to test for rationality: does there exist a utility function that rationalizes the given data, and if yes, can it be used to predict commenting behavior? Finally, we impose behavioral economics constraints stemming from rational inattention to characterize the attention span of groups of users. The test imposes a Rényi mutual information cost constraint which impacts how the agent can select attention strategies to maximize their expected utility. After a careful analysis of a massive YouTube dataset, our surprising result is that in most YouTube user groups, the commenting behavior is consistent with optimizing a Bayesian utility with rationally inattentive constraints. The paper also highlights how the rational inattention model can accurately predict commenting behavior. The massive YouTube dataset and analysis used in this paper are available on GitHub and completely reproducible