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Abstract Allocating students to schools or universities, people to teams or groups, people to urban housing, and matching users on social platforms are prominent examples of allocating limited goods, spaces, or positions to optimize social welfare. We study a welfare maximization problem that arises when such resource allocation scenarios involve peer effects, where people have preferences over the others who are nearby (e.g. their classmates, teammates, neighbors, or partners). We first develop a unified mathematical framework for this “position allocation problem,” which assigns people to positions in a given network, with people caring about both their positions and their neighbors’ attributes. We show that welfare maximization for the corresponding position allocation problem is computationally intractable, even when people have preferences that depend only on who is allocated to nearby positions, and those preferences satisfy simple constraints that arise naturally in urban and other real-world systems. In contrast to this computational lower bound, we show that if people can be classified into a fixed number of (demographic) groups and the network satisfies certain realistic spatial conditions, then efficiently computable allocations can be obtained for many natural scenarios. Importantly, the achieved social welfare is either optimal or arbitrarily close to optimal for natural forms of preferences. Our methods provide a foundation for position allocation with peer effects, and guide the design of optimal allocation strategies when people can be classified into a fixed number of groups in which members share similar preferences. 

Discrete dynamical systems are commonly used to model the spread of contagions on real-world networks. Under the PAC framework, existing research has studied the problem of learning the behavior of a system, assuming that the underlying network is known. In this work, we focus on a more challenging setting: to learn both the behavior and the underlying topology of a black-box system. We show that, in general, this learning problem is computationally intractable. On the positive side, we present efficient learning methods under the PAC model when the underlying graph of the dynamical system belongs to certain classes. Further, we examine a relaxed setting where the topology of an unknown system is partially observed. For this case, we develop an efficient PAC learner to infer the system and establish the sample complexity. Lastly, we present a formal analysis of the expressive power of the hypothesis class of dynamical systems where both the topology and behavior are unknown, using the well-known Natarajan dimension formalism. Our results provide a theoretical foundation for learning both the topology and behavior of discrete dynamical systems. 

Evolutionary anti-coordination games on networks capture real-world strategic situations such as traffic routing and market competition. Two key problems concerning evolutionary games are the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium (NE) and the convergence time. In this work, we study these two problems for anti-coordination games under sequential and synchronous update schemes. For each update scheme, we examine two decision modes based on whether an agent considers its own previous action (self essential) or not (self non-essential) in choosing its next action. Using a relationship between games and dynamical systems, we show that for both update schemes, finding an NE can be done efficiently under the self non-essential mode but is computationally intractable under the self essential mode. We then identify special cases for which an NE can be obtained efficiently. For convergence time, we show that the dynamics converges in a polynomial number of steps under the synchronous scheme; for the sequential scheme, the convergence time is polynomial only under the self non-essential mode. Through experiments, we empirically examine the convergence time and the equilibria for both synthetic and real-world networks. 

Networked discrete dynamical systems are often used to model the spread of contagions and decision-making by agents in coordination games. Fixed points of such dynamical systems represent configurations to which the system converges. In the dissemination of undesirable contagions (such as rumors and misinformation), convergence to fixed points with a small number of affected nodes is a desirable goal. Motivated by such considerations, we formulate a novel optimization problem of finding a nontrivial fixed point of the system with the minimum number of affected nodes. We establish that, unless P = NP, there is no polynomial-time algorithm for approximating a solution to this problem to within the factor n^(1 - epsilon) for any constant epsilon > 0. To cope with this computational intractability, we identify several special cases for which the problem can be solved efficiently. Further, we introduce an integer linear program to address the problem for networks of reasonable sizes. For solving the problem on larger networks, we propose a general heuristic framework along with greedy selection methods. Extensive experimental results on real-world networks demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed heuristics. A full version of the manuscript, source code and data areavailable at: https://github.com/bridgelessqiu/NMIN-FPE 

Nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) such as mask wearing can be effective in mitigating the spread of infectious diseases. Therefore, understanding the behavioral dynamics of NPIs is critical for characterizing the dynamics of disease spread. Nevertheless, standard infection models tend to focus only on disease states, overlooking the dynamics of “beneficial contagions,” e.g., compliance with NPIs. In this work, we investigate the concurrent spread of disease and mask-wearing behavior over multiplex networks. Our proposed framework captures both the competing and complementary relationships between the dueling contagion processes. Further, the model accounts for various behavioral mechanisms that influence mask wearing, such as peer pressure and fear of infection. Our results reveal that under the coupled disease–behavior dynamics, the attack rate of a disease—as a function of transition probability—exhibits a critical transition. Specifically, as the transmission probability exceeds a critical threshold, the attack rate decreases abruptly due to sustained mask-wearing responses. We empirically explore the causes of the critical transition and demonstrate the robustness of the observed phenomena. Our results highlight that without proper enforcement of NPIs, reductions in the disease transmission probability via other interventions may not be sufficient to reduce the final epidemic size.