Note: When clicking on a Digital Object Identifier (DOI) number, you will be taken to an external site maintained by the publisher.
Some full text articles may not yet be available without a charge during the embargo (administrative interval).
What is a DOI Number?
Some links on this page may take you to non-federal websites. Their policies may differ from this site.
-
We consider strategic classification, where agents can strategically manipulate their feature vector to a limited extent in order to be classified as positive. Unlike most prior work, our work considers manipulations to be personalized, meaning that agents can have different levels of manipulation abilities (e.g., varying radii for ball manipulations), and unknown to the learner. We formalize the learning problem in an interaction model where the learner first deploys a classifier and the agent manipulates the feature vector within their manipulation set to game the deployed classifier. We investigate various scenarios in terms of the information available to the learner during the interaction, such as observing the original feature vector before or after deployment, observing the manipulated feature vector, or not seeing either the original or the manipulated feature vector, and provide online mistake bounds and PAC sample complexity in these scenarios for ball manipulations.more » « lessFree, publicly-accessible full text available December 12, 2024
-
In this work, we propose a multi-objective decision making framework that accommodates different user preferences over objectives, where preferences are learned via policy comparisons. Our model consists of a known Markov decision process with a vector-valued reward function, with each user having an unknown preference vector that expresses the relative importance of each objective. The goal is to efficiently compute a near-optimal policy for a given user. We consider two user feedback models. We first address the case where a user is provided with two policies and returns their preferred policy as feedback. We then move to a different user feedback model, where a user is instead provided with two small weighted sets of representative trajectories and selects the preferred one. In both cases, we suggest an algorithm that finds a nearly optimal policy for the user using a number of comparison queries that scales quasilinearly in the number of objectives.more » « lessFree, publicly-accessible full text available December 12, 2024
-
null (Ed.)We study the problem of online learning with primary and secondary losses. For example, a recruiter making decisions of which job applicants to hire might weigh false positives and false negatives equally (the primary loss) but the applicants might weigh false negatives much higher (the secondary loss). We consider the following question: Can we combine "expert advice" to achieve low regret with respect to the primary loss, while at the same time performing {\em not much worse than the worst expert} with respect to the secondary loss? Unfortunately, we show that this goal is unachievable without any bounded variance assumption on the secondary loss. More generally, we consider the goal of minimizing the regret with respect to the primary loss and bounding the secondary loss by a linear threshold. On the positive side, we show that running any switching-limited algorithm can achieve this goal if all experts satisfy the assumption that the secondary loss does not exceed the linear threshold by o(T) for any time interval. If not all experts satisfy this assumption, our algorithms can achieve this goal given access to some external oracles which determine when to deactivate and reactivate experts.more » « less