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Sensory neurons continually adapt their response characteristics according to recent stimulus history. However, it is unclear how such a reactive process can benefit the organism. Here, we test the hypothesis that adaptation actually acts proactively in the sense that it optimally adjusts sensory encoding for future stimuli. We first quantified human subjects’ ability to discriminate visual orientation under different adaptation conditions. Using an information theoretic analysis, we found that adaptation leads to a reallocation of coding resources such that encoding accuracy peaks at the mean orientation of the adaptor while total coding capacity remains constant. We then asked whether this characteristic change in encoding accuracy is predicted by the temporal statistics of natural visual input. Analyzing the retinal input of freely behaving human subjects showed that the distribution of local visual orientations in the retinal input stream indeed peaks at the mean orientation of the preceding input history (i.e., the adaptor). We further tested our hypothesis by analyzing the internal sensory representations of a recurrent neural network trained to predict the next frame of natural scene videos (PredNet). Simulating our human adaptation experiment with PredNet, we found that the network exhibited the same change in encoding accuracy as observed in human subjects. Taken together, our results suggest that adaptation-induced changes in encoding accuracy prepare the visual system for future stimuli. 

Categorical judgments can systematically bias the perceptual interpretation of stimulus features. However, it remained unclear whether categorical judgments directly modify working memory representations or, alternatively, generate these biases via an inference process down-stream from working memory. To address this question we ran two novel psychophysical experiments in which human subjects had to reverse their categorical judgments about a stimulus feature, if incorrect, before providing an estimate of the feature. If categorical judgments indeed directly altered sensory representations in working memory, subjects’ estimates should reflect some aspects of their initial (incorrect) categorical judgment in those trials. We found no traces of the initial categorical judgment. Rather, subjects seemed to be able to flexibly switch their categorical judgment if needed and use the correct corresponding categorical prior to properly perform feature inference. A cross-validated model comparison also revealed that feedback may lead to selective memory recall such that only memory samples that are consistent with the categorical judgment are accepted for the inference process. Our results suggest that categorical judgments do not modify sensory information in working memory but rather act as top-down expectations in the subsequent sensory recall and inference process. 

Making a categorical judgment can systematically bias our subsequent perception of the world. We show that these biases are well explained by a self-consistent Bayesian observer whose perceptual inference process is causally conditioned on the preceding choice. We quantitatively validated the model and its key assumptions with a targeted set of three psychophysical experiments, focusing on a task sequence where subjects first had to make a categorical orientation judgment before estimating the actual orientation of a visual stimulus. Subjects exhibited a high degree of consistency between categorical judgment and estimate, which is difficult to reconcile with alternative models in the face of late, memory related noise. The observed bias patterns resemble the well-known changes in subjective preferences associated with cognitive dissonance, which suggests that the brain’s inference processes may be governed by a universal self-consistency constraint that avoids entertaining ‘dissonant’ interpretations of the evidence.