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  1. Free, publicly-accessible full text available June 22, 2024
  2. Free, publicly-accessible full text available June 22, 2024
  3. IoT devices can be used to complete a wide array of physical tasks, but due to factors such as low computational resources and distributed physical deployment, they are susceptible to a wide array of faulty behaviors. Many devices deployed in homes, vehicles, industrial sites, and hospitals carry a great risk of damage to property, harm to a person, or breach of security if they behave faultily. We propose a general fault handling system named IoTRepair, which shows promising results for effectiveness with limited latency and power overhead in an IoT environment. IoTRepair dynamically organizes and customizes fault-handling techniques to address the unique problems associated with heterogeneous IoT deployments. We evaluate IoTRepair by creating a physical implementation mirroring a typical home environment to motivate the effectiveness of this system. Our evaluation showed that each of our fault-handling functions could be completed within 100 milliseconds after fault identification, which is a fraction of the time that state-of-the-art fault-identification methods take (measured in minutes). The power overhead is equally small, with the computation and device action consuming less than 30 milliwatts. This evaluation shows that IoTRepair not only can be deployed in a physical system, but offers significant benefits at a low overhead. 
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  4. Abstract Millions of consumers depend on smart camera systems to remotely monitor their homes and businesses. However, the architecture and design of popular commercial systems require users to relinquish control of their data to untrusted third parties, such as service providers (e.g., the cloud). Third parties therefore can (and in some instances have) access the video footage without the users’ knowledge or consent—violating the core tenet of user privacy. In this paper, we present CaCTUs , a privacy-preserving smart Camera system Controlled Totally by Users. CaCTUs returns control to the user ; the root of trust begins with the user and is maintained through a series of cryptographic protocols, designed to support popular features, such as sharing, deleting, and viewing videos live. We show that the system can support live streaming with a latency of 2 s at a frame rate of 10 fps and a resolution of 480 p. In so doing, we demonstrate that it is feasible to implement a performant smart-camera system that leverages the convenience of a cloud-based model while retaining the ability to control access to (private) data. 
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  5. The high-profile Spectre attack and its variants have revealed that speculative execution may leave secret-dependent footprints in the cache, allowing an attacker to learn confidential data. However, existing static side-channel detectors either ignore speculative execution, leading to false negatives, or lack a precise cache model, leading to false positives. In this paper, somewhat surprisingly, we show that it is challenging to develop a speculation-aware static analysis with precise cache models: a combination of existing works does not necessarily catch all cache side channels. Motivated by this observation, we present a new semantic definition of security against cache-based side-channel attacks, called Speculative-Aware noninterference (SANI), which is applicable to a variety of attacks and cache models. We also develop SpecSafe to detect the violations of SANI. Unlike other speculation-aware symbolic executors, SpecSafe employs a novel program transformation so that SANI can be soundly checked by speculation-unaware side-channel detectors. SpecSafe is shown to be both scalable and accurate on a set of moderately sized benchmarks, including commonly used cryptography libraries. 
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