Search for: All records

Decision-making in multi-player games can be extremely challenging, particularly under uncertainty. In this work, we propose a new sample-based approximation to a class of stochastic, general-sum, pure Nash games, where each player has an expected-value objective and a set of chance constraints. This new approximation scheme inherits the accuracy of objective approximation from the established sample average approximation (SAA) method and enjoys a feasibility guarantee derived from the scenario optimization literature. We characterize the sample complexity of this new game-theoretic approximation scheme, and observe that high accuracy usually requires a large number of samples, which results in a large number of sampled constraints. To accommodate this, we decompose the approximated game into a set of smaller games with few constraints for each sampled scenario, and propose a decentralized, consensus-based ADMM algorithm to efficiently compute a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) of the approximated game. We prove the convergence of our algorithm to a GNE and empirically demonstrate superior performance relative to a recent baseline algorithm based on ADMM and interior point method. 

Partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) provide a flexible representation for real-world decision and control problems. However, POMDPs are notoriously difficult to solve, especially when the state and observation spaces are continuous or hybrid, which is often the case for physical systems. While recent online sampling-based POMDP algorithms that plan with observation likelihood weighting have shown practical effectiveness, a general theory characterizing the approximation error of the particle filtering techniques that these algorithms use has not previously been proposed. Our main contribution is bounding the error between any POMDP and its corresponding finite sample particle belief MDP (PB-MDP) approximation. This fundamental bridge between PB-MDPs and POMDPs allows us to adapt any sampling-based MDP algorithm to a POMDP by solving the corresponding particle belief MDP, thereby extending the convergence guarantees of the MDP algorithm to the POMDP. Practically, this is implemented by using the particle filter belief transition model as the generative model for the MDP solver. While this requires access to the observation density model from the POMDP, it only increases the transition sampling complexity of the MDP solver by a factor of O(C), where C is the number of particles. Thus, when combined with sparse sampling MDP algorithms, this approach can yield algorithms for POMDPs that have no direct theoretical dependence on the size of the state and observation spaces. In addition to our theoretical contribution, we perform five numerical experiments on benchmark POMDPs to demonstrate that a simple MDP algorithm adapted using PB-MDP approximation, Sparse-PFT, achieves performance competitive with other leading continuous observation POMDP solvers.

 

In multi-agent dynamic games, the Nash equilibrium state trajectory of each agent is determined by its cost function and the information pattern of the game. However, the cost and trajectory of each agent may be unavailable to the other agents. Prior work on using partial observations to infer the costs in dynamic games assumes an open-loop information pattern. In this work, we demonstrate that the feedback Nash equilibrium concept is more expressive and encodes more complex behavior. It is desirable to develop specific tools for inferring players’ objectives in feedback games. Therefore, we consider the dynamic game cost inference problem under the feedback information pattern, using only partial state observations and incomplete trajectory data. To this end, we first propose an inverse feedback game loss function, whose minimizer yields a feedback Nash equilibrium state trajectory closest to the observa- tion data. We characterize the landscape and differentiability of the loss function. Given the difficulty of obtaining the exact gradient, our main contribution is an efficient gradient approximator, which enables a novel inverse feedback game solver that minimizes the loss using first-order optimization. In thorough empirical evaluations, we demonstrate that our algorithm converges reliably and has better robustness and generalization performance than the open-loop baseline method when the observation data reflects a group of players acting in a feedback Nash game.