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Although individuals in some species refuse foods they normally accept if their partner receives a more preferred one, this is not true across all species. The cooperation hypothesis proposes that this species‐level variability evolved because inequity aversion is a mechanism to identify situations in which cooperation is not paying off, and that species regularly observed cooperating should be more likely to be averse to inequity. To rule out other potential explanations of inequity aversion, we need to test the converse as well: species rarely observed cooperating, especially those phylogenetically close to more cooperative species, should belesslikely to be inequity averse. To this end, we tested eight zoo‐housed Western lowland gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) on a token exchange task in which subjects received either the same food reward or a less‐preferred reward for the same or more effort than their partner, recording both refusals to participate in the exchange and refusals to accept the reward. Supporting the cooperation hypothesis, even with procedural differences across sessions, gorillas were significantly more likely to refuse in all conditions in which they received a low‐value food reward after completing an exchange, regardless of what their partner received, suggesting that gorillas were not inequity averse, but instead would not work for a low‐value reward. Additionally, gorillas were more likely to refuse later in the session; while the pattern of refusals remained unchanged after accounting for this, this suggests that species should be tested on as many trials as is practical.

 

Human decision-making is often swayed by irrecoverable investments even though it should only be based on future—and not past—costs and benefits. Although this sunk cost effect is widely documented and can lead to devastating losses, the underlying psychological mechanisms are unclear. To tease apart possible explanations through a comparative approach, we assessed capuchin and rhesus monkeys’ susceptibility to sunk costs in a psychomotor task. Monkeys needed to track a moving target with a joystick-controlled cursor for variable durations. They could stop at any time, ending the trial without reward. To minimize the work required for a reward, monkeys should have always persisted for at least 1 s, but should have abandoned the trial if that did not yield a reward. Capuchin monkeys and especially rhesus macaques persisted to trial completion even when it was suboptimal, and were more likely to complete the trial the longer they had already tracked the target. These effects were less pronounced, although still present, when the change in expected tracking duration was signalled visually. These results show that sunk cost effects can arise in the absence of human-unique factors and may emerge, in part, because persisting can resolve uncertainty.

 

The origins of evolutionary games are rooted in both economics and animal behaviour, but economics has, until recently, focused primarily on humans. Although historically, specific games were used in targeted circumstances with non-human species (i.e. the Prisoner's Dilemma), experimental economics has been increasingly recognized as a valuable method for directly comparing both the outcomes of economic decisions and their underlying mechanisms across species, particularly in comparison with humans, thanks to the structured procedures that allow for them to be instantiated across a variety of animals. So far, results in non-human primates suggest that even when outcomes are shared, underlying proximate mechanisms can vary substantially. Intriguingly, in some contexts non-human primates more easily find a Nash equilibrium than do humans, possibly owing to their greater willingness to explore the parameter space, but humans excel at more complex outcomes, such as alternating between two Nash equilibria, even when deprived of language or instruction, suggesting potential mechanisms that humans have evolved to allow us to solve complex social problems. We consider what these results suggest about the evolution of economic decision-making and suggest future directions, in particular the need to expand taxonomic diversity, to expand this promising approach. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Half a century of evolutionary games: a synthesis of theory, application and future directions'. 

Thinking about possibilities plays a critical role in the choices humans make throughout their lives. Despite this, the influence of individuals' ability to consider what is possible on culture has been largely overlooked. We propose that the ability to reason about future possibilities or prospective cognition, has consequences for cultural change, possibly facilitating the process of cumulative cultural evolution. In particular, by considering potential future costs and benefits of specific behaviours, prospective cognition may lead to a more flexible use of cultural behaviours. In species with limited planning abilities, this may lead to the development of cultures that promote behaviours with future benefits, circumventing this limitation. Here, we examine these ideas from a comparative perspective, considering the relationship between human and nonhuman assessments of future possibilities and their cultural capacity to invent new solutions and improve them over time. Given the methodological difficulties of assessing prospective cognition across species, we focus on planning, for which we have the most data in other species. Elucidating the role of prospective cognition in culture will help us understand the variability in when and how we see culture expressed, informing ongoing debates, such as that surrounding which social learning mechanisms underlie culture. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny’. 

Abstract Humans often experience striking performance deficits when their outcomes are determined by their own performance, colloquially referred to as “choking under pressure.” Physiological stress responses that have been linked to both choking and thriving are well-conserved in primates, but it is unknown whether other primates experience similar effects of pressure. Understanding whether this occurs and, if so, its physiological correlates, will help clarify the evolution and proximate causes of choking in humans. To address this, we trained capuchin monkeys on a computer game that had clearly denoted high- and low-pressure trials, then tested them on trials with the same signals of high pressure, but no difference in task difficulty. Monkeys significantly varied in whether they performed worse or better on high-pressure testing trials and performance improved as monkeys gained experience with performing under pressure. Baseline levels of cortisol were significantly negatively related to performance on high-pressure trials as compared to low-pressure trials. Taken together, this indicates that less experience with pressure may interact with long-term stress to produce choking behavior in early sessions of a task. Our results suggest that performance deficits (or improvements) under pressure are not solely due to human specific factors but are rooted in evolutionarily conserved biological factors. 

Visual attention to facial features is an important way that group-living primate species gain knowledge about others. However, where this attention is focused on the face is influenced by contextual and social features, and emerging evidence in Pan species suggests that oxytocin, a hormone involved in forming and maintaining affiliative bonds among members of the same group, influences social attention as measured by eye gaze. Specifically, bonobos tend to focus on conspecifics’ eyes when viewing two-dimensional images, whereas chimpanzees focus more on the edges of the face. Moreover, exogenous oxytocin, which was hypothesized to increase eye contact in both species, instead enhanced this existing difference. We follow up on this to (1) determine the degree to which this Pan pattern generalizes across highly social, cooperative non-ape primates and (2) explore the impact of exogenously administered vs. endogenously released oxytocin in impacting this behavior. To do so, we tracked gaze direction on a computerized social categorization task using conspecific faces in tufted capuchin monkeys ( Sapajus [Cebus] apella ) after (1) exogenously administering intranasal oxytocin using a nebulizer or (2) inducing an endogenous increase in oxytocin using fur-rubbing, previously validated to increase oxytocin in capuchins. Overall, we did not find a general tendency in the capuchins to look toward the eyes or mouth, but we found that oxytocin was related to looking behavior toward these regions, albeit not in a straightforward way. Considering frequency of looking per trial, monkeys were more likely to look at the eye region in the fur-rubbing condition as compared to either the saline or exogenous oxytocin conditions. However, in terms of duration of looking during trials in which they did look at the eye region, monkeys spent significantly less time looking at the eyes in both oxytocin conditions as compared to the saline condition. These results suggest that oxytocin did not necessarily enhance eye looking in capuchins, which is consistent with the results from Pan species, and that endogenous and exogenous oxytocin may behave differently in their effect on how social attention is allocated.