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In the late 20th century, fetal protection policies barred women from hundreds of thousands of industrial jobs on the pretext that if women became pregnant, their fetuses might be harmed by workplace exposure to toxic chemicals. Beginning in the 1970s, these policies set off a decades-long contest between the chemical industry, government agencies, and the judicial system over how to balance the uncertain reproductive health risks against sex discrimination. This article revives the subject of reproductive health and workplace protections through a historical case study of fetal protection policies at Firestone Plastics, a leader in the postwar vinyl chloride industry. I use formerly secret industry documents to argue that Firestone used scientific uncertainty and gender essentialism to skirt new regulatory pressures and minimize corporate liability. Ultimately, fetal protection policies stymied innovative regulatory efforts to protect all workers—not just women—from reproductive hazards in the workplace. (Am J Public Health. 2022;112(2):271–276. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2021.306539 ) 

Abstract In an ongoing commitment to experimentation, the AHR invited an “open peer review” of a submitted manuscript, “History Can Be Open Source: Democratic Dreams and the Rise of Digital History,” by Joseph L. Locke (University of Houston–Victoria) and Ben Wright (University of Texas at Dallas). Given that Locke and Wright argued for the coexistence of transparency alongside formal academic peer review, subjecting their submission to an open review made sense. The peer review process itself tested the propositions about the democratization of scholarship they put forth in their submission. Their article appears in a new section of the AHR, “Writing History in a Digital Age,” overseen by consulting editor Lara Putnam (https://ahropenreview.com/). The maturation of digital history has propelled historians’ embrace of open educational resources. But, this article argues, open access licensing is not enough. Digital history’s earliest practitioners promised not just more accessible digital materials, but a broader democratization of history itself. This article therefore moves beyond questions of technological innovation and digital access in the rise of digital history to engage more fundamental and intractable questions about inequality, community, and participatory historical inquiry. 

O objetivo deste artigo é analisar as relações entre agnotologia (construção social da ignorância) e o princípio da precaução (PP) sob dois aspectos. O primeiro diz respeito à crítica de que parcela dos defensores do PP teria utilizado estratégias de construção de ignorância. A partir do trabalho do filósofo Daniel Steel, mostro como elas enfraquecem um critério interno ao próprio princípio: a proporcionalidade. Sob o segundo aspecto, comento documentos tornados públicos que evidenciam estratégias de agnotologia por setores da indústria tanto sobre o PP como sobre resultados científicos para que ele não fosse aplicado. Semelhante exposição ainda não foi realizada na literatura especializada no PP. A partir dessa análise, busco contribuir para identificar estratégias de agnotologia em debates sobre o PP. 

When the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) was passed by the US Congress in 1976, its advocates pointed to new generation of genotoxicity tests as a way to systematically screen chemicals for carcinogenicity. However, in the end, TSCA did not require any new testing of commercial chemicals, including these rapid laboratory screens. In addition, although the Environmental Protection Agency was to make public data about the health effects of industrial chemicals, companies routinely used the agency’s obligation to protect confidential business information to prevent such disclosures. This paper traces the contested history of TSCA and its provisions for testing, from the circulation of the first draft bill in the Nixon administration through the debates over its implementation, which stretched into the Reagan administration. The paucity of publicly available health and environmental data concerning chemicals, I argue, was a by-product of the law and its execution, leading to a situation of institutionalized ignorance, the underside of regulatory knowledge. 

The talc industry and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have asserted that talc has been asbestos-free since 1976 when the industry created a voluntary specification for the asbestos content of cosmetic talc. However, recent evidence reveals that cosmetic talc is not and never was asbestos-free. This narrative review examines the talc industry’s role in delaying and ultimately blocking federal regulation of cosmetic talc from the 1970s to today. We review primary source material, including corporate documents released in recent litigation and FDA documents released in response to Freedom of Information Act requests. Our results indicate that the talc industry exerted considerable influence over three key areas: regulatory proceedings at the FDA; testing methods and the manipulation of test results (including undisclosed results); and press coverage and the medical literature. The talc companies’ actions and FDA indifference have had a lasting effect on consumer health, including the regulation of talc by other government agencies. 

This article focuses on the normalization of victimization and harms caused by asbestos, a carcinogenic mineral fiber. To understand the role played by science in hiding the wounds and deaths caused by corporations, the article starts presenting the example of Brazil, where scientific discourse of foreign experts with industry ties are influencing regulation. From there, I examine the disputes for truth in six different medical journals through grounded theory. The results show that authors use some strategies to achieve credibility: avoiding to acknowlegde industry funding; constructing a specific meaning for the controversy about asbestos risks; and reflecting about the consequences os research misconducts. The ways of thinking about asbestos riks and harms are migrating through the international division of scientific labor, both to spread harm and to avoid liability of powerful agents. 

In recent decades, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has become a powerful forum for trade liberalization and regulatory harmonization. OECD members have worked to reconcile divergent national regulatory approaches, applying a single framework across sovereign states, in effect determining whose knowledge-making practices would guide regulatory action throughout the industrialized world. Focusing on US regulators, industry associations, and environmental groups, this article explores the participatory politics of OECD chemical regulation harmonization in the late 1970s to early 1980s. These efforts were conditioned by differential institutional access and resources among stakeholders who sought to shape regulatory knowledge rules. Facing competing European and US approaches to chemical data—a minimum “base set” of test data versus case-by-case determinations—OECD members chose the European approach in 1980. However, US regulatory politics shifted with the election of President Reagan, prompting industry associations to lobby the US government to block the agreement. Examining the micropolitics of these standards in the making, I demonstrate that while long-term structures advantaged industrial actors, ideological alignment with the US government precipitated their decisive influence. The case illustrates the importance of attending to the distinctive politics of international harmonization and the effects on transnational knowledge-making and regulatory intervention.