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Anterior regions of the ventral visual stream encode substantial information about object categories. Are top-down category-level forces critical for arriving at this representation, or can this representation be formed purely through domain-general learning of natural image structure? Here we present a fully self-supervised model which learns to represent individual images, rather than categories, such that views of the same image are embedded nearby in a low-dimensional feature space, distinctly from other recently encountered views. We find that category information implicitly emerges in the local similarity structure of this feature space. Further, these models learn hierarchical features which capture the structure of brain responses across the human ventral visual stream, on par with category-supervised models. These results provide computational support for a domain-general framework guiding the formation of visual representation, where the proximate goal is not explicitly about category information, but is instead to learn unique, compressed descriptions of the visual world.

 

Self-organizing principles provide a computational account for the topographic organization of the high-level visual system. 

After years of experience, humans become experts at perceiving letters. Is this visual capacity attained by learning specialized letter features, or by reusing general visual features previously learned in service of object categorization? To explore this question, we first measured the perceptual similarity of letters in two behavioral tasks, visual search and letter categorization. Then, we trained deep convolutional neural networks on either 26-way letter categorization or 1000-way object categorization, as a way to operationalize possible specialized letter features and general object-based features, respectively. We found that the general object-based features more robustly correlated with the perceptual similarity of letters. We then operationalized additional forms of experience-dependent letter specialization by altering object-trained networks with varied forms of letter training; however, none of these forms of letter specialization improved the match to human behavior. Thus, our findings reveal that it is not necessary to appeal to specialized letter representations to account for perceptual similarity of letters. Instead, we argue that it is more likely that the perception of letters depends on domain-general visual features. 

Abstract Responses to visually presented objects along the cortical surface of the human brain have a large-scale organization reflecting the broad categorical divisions of animacy and object size. Emerging evidence indicates that this topographical organization is supported by differences between objects in mid-level perceptual features. With regard to the timing of neural responses, images of objects quickly evoke neural responses with decodable information about animacy and object size, but are mid-level features sufficient to evoke these rapid neural responses? Or is slower iterative neural processing required to untangle information about animacy and object size from mid-level features, requiring hundreds of milliseconds more processing time? To answer this question, we used EEG to measure human neural responses to images of objects and their texform counterparts—unrecognizable images that preserve some mid-level feature information about texture and coarse form. We found that texform images evoked neural responses with early decodable information about both animacy and real-world size, as early as responses evoked by original images. Furthermore, successful cross-decoding indicates that both texform and original images evoke information about animacy and size through a common underlying neural basis. Broadly, these results indicate that the visual system contains a mid-level feature bank carrying linearly decodable information on animacy and size, which can be rapidly activated without requiring explicit recognition or protracted temporal processing.